Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer by Lien, Molly Warner
American University Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 2
1998
Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law
Lawyer
Molly Warner Lien
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Science and Technology Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lien, Molly W. “Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer.” American University Law Review 48, no.1 (October,
1998): 85-134.
Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer
Keywords
Technology, printing revolution, legal profession, legal education
This essay is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol48/iss1/2
85
ESSAY
TECHNOCENTRISM AND THE SOUL OF
THE COMMON LAW LAWYER
MOLLY WARNER LIEN∗
The very best, the very worst, the most beautiful and the most ugly
illusions about the future for which people sacrificed their lives
were probably to be found in the same place and, what was even
more frightening, were probably the same thing.1
The Temple of Dawn
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, technology has changed both the study and
practice of law.  The law has its own culture, comprising a shared
language, common ethical norms, models of reasoning, and tools of
trade.  As with any culture, changes in the tools used in legal practice
inevitably influence the profession’s development, creativity, and
responsiveness.2  Although technology enhances the study and
practice of law, its use also subtly changes the way lawyers reason and
think.3  This Essay suggests that these changes may be harmful to the
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author thanks Richard Warner, Richard Wright, Suzanne Ehrenberg, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., and
Ron Staudt for reviewing an earlier draft of this Essay.  Thanks are also due to Jacob Corré,
John Lien, Richard McAdams, Deb Quentel and Steve Sowle for many intriguing conversations
on the topic.
1. YUKIO MISHIMA, THE TEMPLE OF DAWN 88 (E. Dale Saunders & Cecilia Segawa Seigle
trans., Knopf 1973).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579,
1583-84 (1989) (discussing the telephone as an example of how technology has affected the
practice of law).
3. See Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese:  Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer
Age, 88 L. LIBR. J. 338, 345 (1996) (discussing how computer research emphasizes facts rather
process of legal reasoning, and that lawyers will use technology more
wisely only if they are aware of its negative impacts.
Previous technological revolutions have had similar effects.  For
example, the invention of the printing press made books widely
available, expanded literacy, and facilitated shared intellectual social
discourse.4  Unfortunately, the printing revolution also eroded the
oral tradition and, to some extent, may have weakened the bonds
between generations.5  Likewise, the invention of television and its
subsequent elevation over print journalism has changed popular
levels of understanding.6  Although television in Western societies
informs a broader audience than the written word, it has relegated
virtually all public discussion to “sound bites” and impoverished the
quality and depth of our shared discourse.7  Given the undisputed
                                                       
than legal concepts or rules).
4. See ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE:
COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE 27-29, 36
(1979) (crediting the printing press for rapidly expanding literacy among lay people and
catalyzing the industrial revolution).
5. See JAMES JOSEPH O’DONNELL, AVATARS OF THE WORD:  FROM PAPYRUS TO CYBERSPACE
(1998).  Some observers argue that the change in learning from oral storytelling to printed
materials altered not only the means, but also the manner and content of communication.  See
JAY DAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE:  THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF WRITING
7 (1991) (noting that print must appeal to a particular audience because it cannot be modified
for various audiences); see also M.E. Katsh, Communication Revolutions and Legal Revolutions:  The
New Media and the Future of Law, 8 NOVA L. REV. 631, 639-40 (1984) (describing oral
communication as very localized and therefore focused on the local community, while the
printed word is easily transportable over great distances and therefore caters to broader
interests); cf. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA:  THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 172
(1964) (arguing that the printed word and its tendency to fix points of view and to support
group thinking contributed to “nationalism, industrialism, mass markets, and universal literacy
and education”); CARL SAGAN, BILLIONS AND BILLIONS:  THOUGHTS ON LIFE AND DEATH AT THE
BRINK OF THE MILLENNIUM 35 (1997) (“The reversal of this trend [of isolationism]—the
movement toward the reacquaintance and reunification of the lost tribes of the human family,
the binding up of the species—has occurred only fairly recently and only because of advances in
technology.”).
6. Cf. M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 102 (1995) (stating that television has
provided a more effective medium for reaching large audiences).
7. See RONALD A. CASS, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND:  VALUE AND DIVERSITY IN
TELEVISION 19 (1981) (noting that news stories are often selected based upon what the public
wishes to see, rather than what it ought to know); JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS:  HOW
THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6-7 (1996) (arguing that the rise of “star
journalism” has compromised journalistic choices about providing valuable information to the
public); Raymond Snoddy, Media Culture “Trivializes Serious Debate”, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1997, at 8
(noting a recent study at the London School of Economics suggesting that the emphasis on
superficiality in media culture represents an “evisceration of moral understanding”); cf.
Theodore Peterson, Why the Mass Media Are That Way, in MASS MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION 56,
70 (Charles S. Steinberg ed. 1972) (“[A]re we right in the notion that although the media have
a responsibility to enlighten the public, the public has no special responsibility to be
enlightened?”).
The prevalence of television as a mass medium has also altered our perception of truth.  As
the author of one essay observed:
Television appears to the viewer to be a description of reality; moreover, reality is
perceived to be on television.  These two propositions—television is about reality, and
benefits of expanded information and knowledge, few would suggest
that knowledge of the adverse consequences of these technologies
would have deterred their use.8  Nevertheless, early awareness of the
side effects might have minimized some of the disadvantages of the
new technologies.9  Therefore, we ought to be aware of similar
concerns about the impact of technology on the nature,
characteristics, and originality of legal analysis.10
It is not my intent to criticize all uses of technology in the legal
profession or education.  To the contrary, I recognize that
technology has broadened our information base to seemingly
limitless proportions.  Word processing and communication
technologies have expanded our work potential and accelerated the
exchange of ideas across both the classroom and the globe.11  That
said, and at the risk of being consigned to the ranks of neo-Luddites,12
I fear that some uses of computer technology may have a negative
                                                       
reality is on television—are different but complementary ideas.  There appears to be a
one-to-one relationship between visual images and reality (actual or imagined) . . . .
[T]he visual image is related to the order of reality.  Sight is the sense we most trust.
Richard Stivers, Technology, Discourse, and Truth, 64 U. CINN. L. REV. 1259, 1266-67 (1996).
8. See, e.g., KATSH, supra note 6, at 88, 237-43 (assuming that easier and expanded access
to information is beneficial to society and that a new technological environment will lead to a
“revolution of perception”).
9. Cf. Stivers, supra note 7, at 1260-61 (discussing the danger that technology may pose by
depersonalizing human relationships and suppressing individuality).  But cf. Jessica T.
Matthews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50-51 (1997) (noting that the political and societal
ramifications of the computer and telecommunications technologies have not been
considered)
10. I raise this issue because in recent years lawyers have embraced the use of technology
in their practices.  See Rosemary Shiels, Technology Update:  Attorneys’ Use of Computers in the
Nation’s 500 Largest Law Firms, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 537, 542 (1996) (providing the results of yearly
surveys taken from 1986 to 1995 demonstrating the prevalence of work stations and local area
networks, as well as the use of online research services).  Each year, the American Bar
Association hosts an annual TechShow.  Even with a substantial registration fee of $795 per
person in 1998, it drew over 1,000 attendees. Telephone Interview with Rosemary Shiels,
Director of the Section on Law Practice Management, American Bar Association (Mar. 8, 1999).
11. One observer commented that technology has even transformed political networks:
The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the rise of
nonstate actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution, whose deep
political and social consequences have been almost completely ignored.  Widely
accessible and affordable technology has broken governments’ monopoly on the
collection and management of large amounts of information and deprived
governments of the deference they enjoyed because of it.  In every sphere of activity,
instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use multiplied the
number of players who matter . . . .
Matthews, supra note 9, at 51.
12. Neo-Luddites believe that technology has a negative impact on society.  The original
Luddites were people in early nineteenth-century England who reacted to the Industrial
Revolution by destroying looms, burning factories and breaking machinery.  See Reed Karaim,
Technology and its Discontents, CIVILIZATION, May/June 1995, at 50; see also Andrew Jackson
Heimert, Uncommon Property, 105 YALE L.J. 2297, 2300 n.17 (1996) (reviewing THEODORE
STEINBERG, SLIDE MOUNTAIN, OR, THE FOLLY OF OWNING NATURE (1995)) (comparing the
traditional notion of the Luddite with the views of the author).
impact on the soul of the law.  Insensate use of computers, both in
legal education and practice, is altering the way we think about and
use the law.13
I base my concerns about the emphasis on using technology in
legal practice and education on a number of factors.  First, to date,
no empirical study exists which explores whether the presentation of
information in an electronic format supports the learning and
problem solving processes in cases of complex texts such as case
decisions and statutes.14  Because cases are rarely simple, they are best
read using a methodology that encourages deep reading and mastery,
rather than the process of rapid rule extraction that often
accompanies texts located through the use of isolated word searches.
Given these basic assumptions, it is troubling, if not astounding, that
few scholars have evaluated how the technology affects the nature
and quality of legal reading and legal analysis.15
Second, just as television created “sound bite” journalism and
discourse, technology seems to generate “law-byte” reasoning and
hypertext16 analysis.17  Lawyers and law students increasingly focus on
                                                       
13. The inquiry is a timely one because many law schools including Chicago-Kent, Detroit
College of Law, Duke, Florida, Hamline, Illinois, Indiana-Bloomington, Northwestern, Nova
Southeastern, Oregon, Regent, Richmond, Stetson, Villanova, and Wisconsin require either all
students, or students in designated sections, to buy computers, and in some cases even require
students to equip their computers with infobase technology.  See James E. Duggan, Mandating
Computer Ownership at Law Schools:  A Survey (last modified Feb. 13, 1998)
<http://www.siu.edu/offices/lawlib/survey.htm>.
14. More broadly, there is no empirical evidence that demonstrates that computer
learning in general is more effective than learning through traditional methods.  See Karaim,
supra note 12, at 48 (summarizing comments by Theodore Roszak, Professor of History at
California State University).  Nearly all the literature on the subject of technology focuses on
how to use more of it, rather than whether or when it should be used.  See, e.g., RUSSELL W. BURRIS,
COMPUTER NETWORK EXPERIMENTS IN TEACHING LAW 51-62 (1980) (reporting that a series of
experiments demonstrated the benefits of computer-based exercises for teaching the law);
Peter B. Maggs & Thomas D. Morgan, Computer-Based Legal Education at the University of Illinois:  A
Report of Two Years’ Experience, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 138, 141-51, 154-56 (1975) (describing the
experiences using the PLATO method of computer-assisted instruction and noting that some
limitations may be corrected with advanced technology).  See generally Paul F. Teich, How
Effective is Computer-Assisted Instruction?  An Evaluation for Legal Educators, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489,
497-501 (1991) (surveying journal articles and dissertations which reviewed empirical studies on
the effectiveness of computer-aided instruction as a legal teaching technique).
15. When he wrote about undergraduate education, Mark Shields was disturbed by the
lack of critical evaluation of the effectiveness of computers in the classroom.  See Mark A.
Shields, Academe Enters Age of Anticippointment, 4 TECHNOS 30 (1995) (expressing concern that
the strong emphasis on technological success simply reflects the societal bias that new
technology necessarily represents progress), reprinted in Mark A. Shields, Academe and the
Technology Totem, EDUC. DIG., Feb. 1996, at 43, 47.  As a result, he labeled the phenomenon
“techno-utopianism.”  See id. at 43.
16. Hypertext is a computer technology which permits one to move from any spot in a text
to any subject of one’s choosing simply by pressing a key.  See KATSH, supra note 6, at 18.
17. See Bintliff, supra note 3, at 340 (asserting that “meaning doesn’t come from data
alone” and context and interrelationships are equally important).
accessing, managing, and linking information,18 and devote less time
and energy to careful analysis or critical evaluation of legal rules.19
While technology unquestionably gives lawyers the ability to marshal
bits of information instantly from a host of cases, and to dispatch
them into memoranda and briefs like well-drilled soldiers in a war of
logic, the speed of deployment inevitably discourages lawyers from
taking the time to analyze the wisdom, correctness and applicability
of legal arguments.  Lawyers and law students using “law-bytes”
inevitably pay less attention to the reasoning, theory and policy that
drive a decision, and give less consideration to the justness of the
result.20  Concomitantly, the methodology of researching in and
working with electronic texts encourages work habits that prioritize
speed and all too easily enable lawyers to find a kernel of phraseology
that may support their often incorrect preconceived notions.21
Third, both basic learning theory and the observation of teachers
and law firm partners suggest that technocentric pedagogy can be a
disadvantage to certain individual learning styles.22  We should not
assume that legal learning and analysis will improve with greater use
of technology.23  Too many conferences and faculty meetings start
with the agenda item, “How can we use more technology in our
classroom or practice?” which assumes the superiority of “law-byte”
methodology.  The question should be, “How can we improve our
teaching or lawyering?”,  Lawyers should use technology only when it
                                                       
18. See id. at 349 (observing that lawyers are typically satisfied once a computer search
yields a short citation list).
19. See id. at 345 (arguing that lawyers using technology overemphasize parallel facts rather
than legal theories when building precedential support); cf. Karaim, supra note 12, at 48
(quoting Professor Roszak, who stated that “the mind thinks with ideas, not with information”).
20. See Bintliff, supra note 3, at 350 n.5. (arguing that the emphasis on matching facts
encourages the disregard of legal rules).
21. See id. at 348 (observing that reliance on computer search terms limits a legal
researcher’s ability to see the broad picture).
The recent change in practice among the federal courts to accept brief filings in hypertext
may affect judicial review as well.  See Francis X. Gindhart & Carl R. Moy, High-Tech Appeals:  Can
Hypertext Briefs Aid Justice Without Changing the System?, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 78, 78-79 (debating
whether the inclusion of video clips of testimony will alter the standard of review and result in
appellate courts giving less deference to the trier of fact).  In January, 1997, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit accepted a brief on CD-ROM in a hypertext format.  See
id. at 78.  The brief contained internal links which allowed the court to jump from key points to
video clips of testimony and from case text to quotes.  See id.  Rather than considering the
arguments of the parties in their entirety, over-burdened judges may be tempted to access only
those points that appear most interesting from the summary of argument.  See id. at 79
(explaining that the use of hypertext medium may enable a party to overcome its opponent’s
power to persuade).
22. See infra notes 187-210 and accompanying text (evaluating the impact of different types
of technology and methods of instruction on styles and techniques of learning).
23. See Bintliff, supra note 3, at 344-45 (stating that searching for information with current
technology is significantly easier but does not identify essential legal issues).
improves their efficiency and access to information—it should
complement, not supplement legal reasoning.
Finally, excessive emphasis on computer drills predisposes the law
student to treat the law as an overly simplistic body of rules which
provides a formulaic foundation for prediction.24  This may appeal to
extreme positivists,25 ever in search of iron rules,26 but it is
inconsistent with the role of the common law lawyer.  Using legal
rules effectively consists of more than the ability to recite and apply
them.  As James Boyd White observed, cases represent
communications and conversations,27 and case analysis has generated
an extensive literature on discourse, style, analysis, and rhetoric.28  An
understanding of the law as interpreted by the courts requires close
attention not merely to isolated pronouncements but also to the
                                                       
24. See id. at 346 (warning against technology oversimplifying the law).
Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 381-82 (1946).  See generally
NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-32 (1995) (investigating process
jurisprudence as it was the beginning of reason, not deductive logic or intuition, as the
dominant ideological framework of American legal thought).
25. Positivism is the neutral, value-free approach to the study of law as a science.  See MARIO
JORI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL POSITIVISM xii (1992).
26. As Lon Fuller observed, positivists crave rules and prefer to view law not as the product
of contextual reason, but as fiat:
[T]he [school of] extreme positivists is hard at work to cut the fiat branch loose from
reason . . . .  To convert the whole of law into fiat, it is, of course, necessary to make it
the fiat of some person or thing.  So we find this school insisting, for example, that
custom, no matter how widespread, reasonable and clearly promotive of the social
welfare it may be, can never be “law” until it has been stamped as such . . . .
 . . .[W]hen we deal with law, not in terms of definitions and authorization sources,
but in terms of problems and functions, we inevitably see that it is compounded of
reason and fiat, of order discovered and order imposed, and that to attempt to
eliminate either of these aspects of the law is to denature and falsify it.
Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 381 (1946).  See generally NEIL
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-32 (1995) (investigating process
jurisprudence as it brought about “reason” as the dominant ideological framework of American
legal thought to explain legal decision-making).
27. Professor White strenuously argued that judicial opinions are conversations that
contain multiple levels of meaning:
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning:  it describes the case, telling its story in a
particular way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the process it connects the case
with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general concerns.  It translates the
experience of the parties, and the languages in which they naturally speak of it, into
the language of the law, which connects cases across time and space; and it translates
the texts of the law—the statutes and opinions and constitutional provisions—into the
terms defined by the facts of the present case.  The opinion thus engages the central
conversation that is for us the law, a conversation that the opinion itself makes
possible.  In doing these things it makes two claims of authority:  for the texts and
judgments to which it appeals, and for the methods by which it works.
James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367-68 (1995).
28. See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:  AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM 89-215 (1990) (providing an in-depth analysis of a series of judicial opinions in
the context of culture and rhetoric).
court’s use of language, tone, metaphor, and storytelling.29
The role of the common law lawyer is to understand the breadth
and limitations of rules, and to be able to argue why applying,
creating, modifying or extending the rules serves the interests of
justice.30  Common law lawyers treat the law not as accumulated data
                                                       
29. Numerous writers have commented at length and engaged in vigorous debate on the
impact of style and rhetoric on legal discourse as espoused by Professor White.  See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE:  A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 270-99 (1988)
(asserting that rhetoric and style can help resolve legal questions when logic and empiricism
alone fail); IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE:  POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 3-27, 50-54 (1995)
(finding that the “two kinds of law and literature—law in and law as—are in no way exclusive”
and are indistinguishable); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
LITERATURE 188, 244-50 (1992) (detailing White’s failed attempt to restore legal rhetoric);
ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 345-418 (1993) (arguing that reading opinions
as literature expands understanding of the law and better equips us to mold the law towards an
ideal); Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Development of Legal Culture:
Russian Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923, 929-31 (1997)
(detailing Professor White’s “two metaphors” analysis that likens a judicial opinion to:  (1) a
theatrical “performance” and, (2) a “conversation” between the judge and the reader, which
illustrates how judicial opinions allow the court to communicate with the parties, legal
commentators and the lay audience); Sanford Levinson, Conversing About Justice, 100 YALE L.J.
1855, 1873-78 (1991) (reviewing JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:  AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990)) (criticizing Professor White’s failure to address the
connection between justice and conversation among differing perspectives); Frederick Schauer,
Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1474 (1995) (proposing that an analysis of whether a
judicial opinion had an intended effect would yield more positive critiques than an analysis of
how the opinion reads).
Much of the debate has centered around the definition of the discipline known as “law and
literature.”  See WARD, supra, at 3 (noting that in law and literature studies, there is a distinction
between law in literature and law as literature, and explaining that “law in literature” focuses on
the relevancy of literary texts to the study of law, while “law as literature” uses literary criticism
to critique legal texts).  The ultimate issue is whether such a discipline should encompass both
a study of law in literature and law as literature, or whether ascribing undue significance to legal
narrative is unwarranted.  See id. at 26 (explaining how the combined study of “law in” and “law
as” literature helps to clarify legal issues).
Some scholars argue, particularly in the context of constitutional adjudication, that the style
and content of Supreme Court adjudication has had a negative impact on the role of informing
and educating the public.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Missing the “Play of Intelligence,” 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 147, 149 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court is mired in the the technical
formalities of “three prong tests” and “levels of scrutiny”–losing the informative value of its
opinions); see also, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change:  Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 117 (1993) (arguing that the Court has
increasingly relied on “highly technical formulae” or “mechanical jurisprudence” in an attempt
to avoid resolving conflict between originalism and modernism and therefore failing to
properly progress and thereby educate the public); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution,
84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165 (1985) (critiquing the excessive use of “tests,” “prongs,”
“requirements,” “standards,” and “hurdles” in Supreme Court opinions which distance “the
Justices from both their audience, the American public, and their text, the Constitution”).
These scholars argue that the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional structure is to
inform and educate the public.  See id. at 74 (suggesting that the public is denied actual
constitutional practice, but that the Supreme Court provides some alternative to the loss of self-
government).  For a fascinating judicial perspective, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results
and the Results of Rhetoric:  Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1386-1415 (1995)
(describing the uses and effects of rhetoric in judicial opinions).
30. See James Douglas, The Distinction Between Lawyers as Advocates and as Activists; and the
Role of the Law School Dean in Facilitating the Justice Mission, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 405, 407 (1992)
(stating that lawyers must have the ability to recognize the parameters of law in order to
but as the embodiment of doctrine, theory, philosophy, humanity,
and emotion.31  The judicial decisions that exemplify the law as a tool
for social change took these factors into consideration in either
overturning precedent or addressing an issue in the absence of pre-
existing rules.32  Encouraging lawyers to adopt technology for its own
sake and to develop a working style that focuses on specific phrases
rather than general concepts may divert legal problem solving away
from what is just and inhibit the evolution of the common law.
This Essay does not purport to provide answers to the problems
raised by the recent explosion of legal technology, but it does raise
questions about whether the tools we use in the practice of law affect
our work as lawyers.  First, this piece surveys those legal skills
traditionally associated with technology and considers how the newer
                                                       
advocate effectively for legal change).
31. Most would not dispute the first three propositions.  As Roscoe Pound observed in
1936:
[W]hat is to guide this judicial search for the law through trial and error?  What is to
hold down this judicial experimenting with tentative legal propositions in the
endeavor to find the practicable precept and to define it by inclusion and exclusion
through experience? . . . Our theory of judicial decision must recognize what actually
takes place and why, and must endeavor to give a rational account of it.  But it must
also give a rational account of the check upon the process upon which we must rely for
safeguarding the general security, and enable us to make that check the most effective
for that purpose and yet the least obstructive of legal growth and of the
individualization of decision that may be.  To do this it must give us a picture of the
end of the law and of the legal and social order adequate to those demands.
ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 125-26 (1938); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 285 (1986) (“A successful interpretation must not only fit but also
justify the practice it interprets.”).
The role of emotion in law is more controversial, and yet, deeply rooted in the decision-
making process of the common law court.  See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 21 (David D. Raphael & Alec L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759)
(recognizing that emotions affect judgment).  For example, Smith framed the notion of public
rationality by describing an impartial or judicious spectator.  See id. at 12.  The impartiality of
the spectator, however, does not mean that principles are to be applied without feelings.  Smith
noted:
[T]he spectator must, first of all, endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in the
situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of
distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer.  He must adopt the whole case of his
companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible,
that imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded.
Id. at 21.  In her comments on this passage, Professor Martha Nussbaum noted that the
judicious observer must have emotions to feel compassion, but noted that, “[t]o be a good
guide, the emotion, first of all, has to be informed by a true view of what is going on, of the facts
of the case, of their significance for all the actors in the situation, and of any dimensions of
their real significance that may elude or be distorted in the consciousness of the actors.”
Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23, 27-28 (1996)
(discussing the need to temper emotion with reason, both of which are essential elements in
judicial analysis and writing).
32. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart:  Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 973 (1997) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1968), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) as creating societal
change through overturning embedded doctrines).
uses of technology differ.  Second, this Essay examines the uses of
technology-based education and work environments and evaluates
whether we have adequately assessed their impact on legal analysis in
general, or on different learning and working styles in particular.
Finally, it concludes that both legal educators and lawyers should be
aware that “technocentrism” may encourage recitation rather than
creativity, and calculated prediction rather than advocacy.  We must
not allow the media in which we study, read, and learn to change our
legal discourse.  As we adopt new methods of learning, teaching, and
working, we must ensure that they do not hamper the flexibility,
spirit, and humanity that have distinguished the common law.
I. LAWYERING, LEARNING, AND TECHNOLOGY
The law’s swift embrace of newly available technology is
understandable.  A brief overview of the technological innovations of
the last twenty years suggests that many have conferred substantial
benefits on the profession.33  In particular, information technology,
which is the most familiar technological advancement, gives lawyers
access to amounts of legal information previously undreamed of,
much of which was available only to those practicing near major
university or government libraries.34  Information technology expands
all lawyers’ research capabilities, enabling lawyers to research
international and foreign law, empowering lawyers to utilize a
broader comparative framework, and fostering the growth of an
international legal culture that can respond to the development of an
ever-expanding global commercial structure.35  Further, it provides
access to factual information, much of which was previously
obtainable only through an unwieldy and expensive discovery
                                                       
33. See Stuart S. Nagel, COMPUTER-AIDED JUDICIAL ANALYSIS:  PREDICTING, PRESCRIBING,
AND ADMINISTERING 26-28, 290-304 (1992) (discussing how technology has helped to improve
judicial decision-making and judicial administration).
34. See Rita Millican & Danny P. Wallace, Research Needs in Academic Law Libraries, 84 L.
LIBR. J. 421, 425 (1992) (arguing that the increasing availability of information and the use of
online networks at formerly “small” law libraries requires standardization of law library
procedures); see also Eugene Volokh, Computer Media for the Legal Profession, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2058, 2059 (1996) (assessing the benefits of online information technology ranging from
distribution of previously non-cost effective information to timely availability of online
discussions of legal issues with professionals and academics).
35. See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence in the
Information Age, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 81-82 (noting that the expanded information
flow has increased the importance of nongovernmental actions); Peter B. Maggs, Legal Data
Banks in the United States and Their Use in Comparative Law, 22 INT’L J. OF LEGAL INFO. 214, 220-27
(1994) (discussing legal data banks such as WESTLAW and LEXIS and expert systems, which
answer legal questions based on a centralized system of rules, problems associated with the
development of these databases in the field of international law, and the significance of
databanks for the unification of law).
process.36
In light of the evolution of the law, the emergence of online legal
and factual databases is a predictable development.37  In the earlier
part of the nineteenth century, attorneys could easily read all of the
year’s decisions from their jurisdiction.38  In fact, lawyers became
                                                       
36. See generally Donald F. Parsons, Jr. and Lisa K. W. Crossland, Technological Tools for Civil
Litigation, DEL. LAW., Winter 1996, at 33-36 (discussing how recent technological advances
facilitate a higher quality work product and are “invaluable” in assisting attorneys in developing
the facts of their cases).
Discontent with the expense of the discovery process is well documented.  See James S.
Kakalik et al., Discovery Management:  Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data,
39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 634 (1998) (arguing that in the future, the scope of discovery will be
shaped by the availability of information technology); see also W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 162-88 (1968) (providing an elaboration on the specific expenses in
discovery process and noting that attorney’s fees contribute substantially to costs); FRANCIS H.
HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE:  COMBATING STONEWALLING AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES
81-115 (1994) (discussing stonewalling techniques that increase the opposing party’s discovery
costs in an effort to overwhelm opposing counsel and have the matter dropped); A. Leo Levin
& Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 219, 229 (1985) (noting
that discovery costs have risen as a result of the increased number of complex litigation filings).
Justice Powell routinely dissented to amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
noting that “[d]elay and excessive expense now characterize a large percentage of all civil
litigation.  The problems arise in significant part, as every judge and litigator knows, from abuse
of the discovery procedures available under the Rules.”  Amendments to Fed. Rules of. Civil
Procedure., 446 U.S. 997, 999 (1980) (citation omitted).
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 addressed concerns about the financial impact of delays
in the discovery process by explicitly stating that each federal court adopt and implement a
delay and expense reduction plan.  See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482
(1994) (facilitating efficient, timely, inexpensive, and just resolutions of civil matters).  The
most recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including a requirement of
automatic disclosure of all information related to facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings, are all calculated to increase efficiency and decrease the cost of litigation.  See FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note (encouraging judges to identify excessive, unnecessary
discovery and amend its inefficient practices).  For a seminal discussion on the need for reform
to facilitate the flow of information, see Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil
Discovery:  A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1303-04, 1348 (1978)
(noting that fundamental flaws in the discovery system have worked to impair its basic purpose
and proposing that reforms are necessary).
37. See William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 L. LIBR. J.
543, 552-55 (1985) (discussing the evolution of both WestLaw and LEXIS and the process by
which technical difficulties of both were resolved).
38.   Of course, this proposition assumes that a lawyer could obtain the decisions.  See
GEORGE S. GROSSMAN, LEGAL RESEARCH:  HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC AGE 39
(1994) (stating that decisions were not regularly published and lawyers had to rely significantly
on English law books); Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter:  An Institutional
Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1302 (1985) (discussing the long
delay between the publication of Reporters due to the need to collect a sufficient number of
cases).  Even the early reports of the United States Supreme Court were unavailable.  See
generally WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 5-22 (1996) (discussing the history
of reporting and publishing Supreme Court judicial opinions).  Entrepreneur Alexander Dallas
initially published Supreme Court decisions in his reports of Pennsylvania cases.  See id. at 7
(recounting Dallas’ work as a reporter).  However, the reports were often criticized both for
inaccuracies and the slowness of publication.  See id. (stating that reports were published six
years after an opinion and were filled with errors because Dallas took incomplete notes).
Another reporter, William Cranch, experienced similar difficulties.  See id. (explaining that
these volumes were also tardy, inaccurate, incomplete, and costly).  The quality of the reports
improved when Henry Wheaton, a personal friend of Justice Joseph Story, was appointed in
eligible for admission to the bar through an apprentice system in
which they literally “read” the law under the tutelage of an
established practitioner.39  Formal legal education gained popularity
with the Langdellian method of teaching students to “think like
lawyers” by using the Socratic dialogue and limiting readings to those
contained in a casebook or prepared course materials.40  The method
emphasized an active dialogue about the reasons for a decision, how
it might be applied or distinguished, and its consistency with
applicable precedents, policies, and theories.41  Langdellian
education was predicated on the assumption that law is a science, that
its “data” consists of cases, and that the study of law facilitated
orderly, near-mathematical prediction of results.42
                                                       
1816.  See id. at 8.  Nevertheless, the service was too expensive.  See id. (stating that the delay was
only three years, but was priced at a steep $7.50 per volume).  By 1922, the United States
Government published the official United States Reports.  See id. at 17 (explaining that the
government assumed responsibility over publication only out of necessity because it could not
afford to contract a publisher); see also Joyce, supra, at 1338 (commenting that Wheaton’s
emphasis on quality increased production costs and made reports inaccessible to consumers).
See generally Thomas J. Young, Jr., A Look at American Law Reporting in the Nineteenth Century, 68 L.
LIBR. J. 294, 294-300, 305 (1975) (providing a historical overview of law reporting and how its
development reflected philosophies about public production of Supreme Court opinions).
Prior to the development of the National Reporter System by John West, who undertook the
work of publishing all available cases, lawyers in many states were forced to rely on journals or
annotated reporters with selected cases.  See Thomas A. Woxland, Forever Associated with the
Practice of Law:  The Early Years of the West Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q.,
Spring 1995, at 115, 118-19 (detailing the start and growth of West’s reporting system).  In the
nineteenth century, some jurisdictions were already suffering from what members of the bar
viewed as a danger of being overwhelmed by too much material.  See REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON LAW REPORTING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(1873) (recommending more expansive reporting of decisions from the jurisdiction in order to
create a more complete reporting system), reprinted in GROSSMAN, supra, at 58-66.
39. See WILLIAM JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS:  A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL
CULTURES 42-57 (1978).
40. See Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 57 (1992)
(“Nearly everyone agrees—in an ‘indefinable chant whose repetition suggests sacred
meaning,’—that the purpose of law school is to teach every student to ‘think like a lawyer.’”).
41. Christopher Columbus Langdell, appointed Dean of Harvard Law School in 1870, is
credited by most historians as the founder of modern American legal education.  See, e.g., DAVID
F. CAVERS, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8-10, 17-20 (1960) (providing an overview
of the history of legal education in the United States and discussing Langdell’s role); CHARLES
WARREN, 2 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 419-21 (1908) (referring to the case method
as the “Langdell System”); SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW:  AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 71-87 (1941)
(describing his experiences using the Langdellian case method while he was a Harvard law
student); William Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 55 AMER. L. REG. 273, 273-84 (1907)
(recounting first-hand observations of Langdell’s lectures, case method, published works,
personal history and personality); Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy:  Living with the Case
Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517, 520-44, 565-79 (1991) (outlining the development of the case
method and the justifications and problems associated with its continued use); cf. Anthony
Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 331 (1979) (proposing that
Langdell was the sole creator of the case method and other educational reforms that
contributed independently to the development of the case system).
42. See MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 5 (1980) (“[L]aw was
conceived of as a science  . . .  the hand maiden of a stable society.”); James E. Moliterno, An
Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools:  Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the
Ironically, despite its emphasis on the dispassionate dissection of
cases, the Socratic method has had one very different effect on the
way lawyers approach their craft.43  As the amount of class time spent
discussing the rationale and justness of the rules increases, law
became as much an art as a science,44  Through this method, students
develop the ability to predict, critique and advocate change.45
Although other teaching methods have also emerged,46 few would
dispute that the Socratic method remains dominant, and that it
fosters resourcefulness and creativity.47
The pure Langdellian approach initially utilized a closed universe
of cases as teaching materials.48  The method did not require, and
                                                       
Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CINN. L. REV. 83, 85 (1991) (stating that the Harvard method was
based on the idea that law was a science and could be taught as such).
43. Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education:  Its Origins and
Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 23-24 (1951) (stating that through the case method, lawyers
developed legal reasoning skills and as a result, could complete other tasks such as collective
analysis and legislative drafting).
44. Cf. Steven Allen Childress, The Baby and the Bathwater:  Salvaging a Positive Socratic
Method, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 333, 336 (1982) (explaining that Socratic dialogue was more of
a process than a doctrine, utilizing scientific principles of deductive reasoning and precedent).
45. See id. at 350 (concluding that the Socratic dialogue encourages creativity and teaches
students to recognize and organize tenets and moral values).
46. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson & Charles E. Kirkwood, Teaching Civil Procedure with the Aid
of Local Tort Litigation, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215, 230 (1987) (advocating the use of simulation or
role playing in teaching of civil procedure); Arthur D. Austin, Is the Casebook Method Obsolete?, 6
WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 165-66 (1965) (arguing for the substitution of the case method with
lecture after the first year of law school); Donald B. King, Simulated Game Playing in Law School:
An Experiment, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 580, 581-85 (1974) (explaining how simulated games can be
used for teaching law); Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 654, 657-62 (1984) (encouraging the use of the problem method in advanced legal
education classes); Philip G. Schrag, The Serpent Strikes:  Simulation in a Large First-Year Course, 39
J. LEGAL EDUC. 555, 566-69 (1989) (reporting the positive results of a year-long simulation with
a model case for teaching Civil Procedure).
47. See Paul Bateman, Toward Diversity in Teaching Methods in Law Schools:  Five Suggestions
from the Back Row, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 397, 411 (1997) (stating the Socratic Method is the
most commonly used classroom technique among those who teach first-year classes); Cynthia G.
Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy:  The Debate Over Teaching Method
Continues, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 5 (1998) (stating that the Socratic Method remains the
primary teaching method today).
48. See David E. Engdahl, Casebooks and Constitutional Competency, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741,
748 (1998) (recognizing that Langdell’s model of case-method law teaching consisted of
“massing barely edited cases”).  One critic observed that the purpose of the Langdellian
approach is to “isolate and analyze the relatively few principles of the common law that the
Harvard system postulated and to show how some . . . judges deviated from them.”  ROBERT
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 53
(1983).  Proponents of the case method laud its effectiveness in teaching students to make
judgments based on individualized sets of facts.  See Patterson, supra note 43, at 7 (crediting the
case method with teaching law students legal reasoning); see also Weaver, supra note 41, at 550-
51 (stating that critical analysis is learned by drawing distinctions between factually similar
cases).  Others have credited it with empowering the profession to engage in independent legal
analysis.  See James M. Dente, A Century of the Case Method:  An Apologia, 50 WASH. L. REV. 93, 96
(1974) (explaining that the purpose of instructing is to empower student with skills so that in
the future they can assess the law); see also Patterson, supra note 43, at 21 (stating that the case
method requires students to synthesize subject matter independently).  Critics have faulted the
gave little emphasis to, enabling students to filter, synthesize, or make
judgments as to the value and weight of large numbers of conflicting
authorities.49  Ultimately, however, educators began to recognize that
teaching solely from a casebook did not adequately prepare students
to analyze and solve legal problems in practice.50  They felt that
lawyers needed to be able to evaluate problems not merely where a
few preselected rules governed the problem, but also in the contexts
of conflicting authority or the absence of authority.51  Consequently,
courses focusing on legal research, writing, and analysis entered the
law school curriculum in response to the need to prepare students
for practice.52  In turn, these new curricula facilitated the rapid
                                                       
method for engaging only a small number of students during a single class.  See Maggs &
Morgan, supra note 14, at 140 (“For many students the Socratic method must consist of
listening to others answer questions 99% of the time and answering them themselves only 1% of
the time.”); see also Austin, supra note 46, at 165 (arguing that student’s interest level decreases
after prolonged exposure to the case method because the analysis becomes less of a challenge).
49. See Austin, supra note 46, at 165 (explaining that the exhaustive analysis required for
each case reduced the amount of time available for considering a larger body of authority).
50. A contributing factor to this change in opinion was the advent of Legal Realism, which
viewed the lawyer as a steward of justice rather than a predictor or formulator of large-scale,
order-oriented social policy.  See KELLY, supra note 42, at 10 (explaining that Realists viewed
lawyers as “guardians of the democratic process”).  Proponents of the school argued for the
clinical method, on the theory that placing students in an environment of clients and courts
better trains students to fulfill this role.  See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School, 81  U.
PA. L. REV. 907, 918 (1933) (arguing that the clinical method allows law students to see the
“human side of administration of justice”); see also George K. Gardner, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-
School—Some Reflections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 800 (1934) (agreeing with Frank that some
practical education is beneficial but should be in the form of apprenticeship and not law school
clinic); R.J. Glennon, Portrait of the Judge as an Activist:  Jerome Frank and the Supreme Court, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 950, 963-64 (1976) (discussing Frank’s “reforming spirit” and the necessity of
reexamining accepted law if found inadequate in practical application).
51. As Professor Robert Berring observed, the law is unique from the humanities because it
is based on assumed rules and norms:
Because legal researchers are so accustomed to this idea [of rules], it is difficult to
realize how unique this concept is in the world of information.  In most fields in the
humanities or social sciences, a search of the literature will reveal certain orthodoxies
or prevailing views, certain points in contention with each side having its own warrior-
like adherents, but there are no points of primary authority.  There are no nuggets of
truth or treasure . . .  Legal researchers believe that there are answers out there that
are not just powerfully persuasive, but are the law itself.
Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe:  The Imperative Digital
Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 14 (1994); see also PATRICK WILSON, SECONDHAND KNOWLEDGE:
AN INQUIRY INTO COGNITIVE AUTHORITY 132 (1983) (arguing that professionals must also
determine the trustworthiness of the information’s source when deciding whether or not
information is applicable).
52. The first legal writing program was instituted by Dean Harry A. Bigelow in the 1930s at
the University of Chicago Law School.  See Robin K. Mills, Legal Research Instruction in Law
Schools, The State of the Art or, Why Law School Graduates Do Not Know How to Find the Law, 70 L.
LIBR. J. 343, 344 (1977) (crediting the University of Chicago with introducing the first legal
methods program).  Another early pioneer was Marjorie Dick Rombauer at the University of
Washington.  See Berring, supra note 51, at 25 (stating that Rombauer viewed legal research
training as “an inherent part of the analyzing and categorizing function,” rather than a separate
part of the first-year experience); cf. MARJORIE DICK ROMBAUER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING:
ANALYSIS, RESEARCH & WRITING (5th ed. 1991) (introducing research-oriented problem solving
integration of online information technologies.53  In 1989, the
American Bar Association finally began a study of the relationship
between legal education and the practice of law.54  The project
produced the 1992 MacCrate Report which identified ten
fundamental skills required of lawyers, including the ability to
conduct legal research.55
                                                       
methods to first-year students in a textbook format).  But see Robert F. Blomquist, Some Thoughts
on Law School Curriculum Reform:  Scaling The Mountainside, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 641, 660 (1995)
(suggesting that legal educators may ultimately cut back on skills training on the theory that law
firms should take responsibility for training lawyers in research and writing).  When Professor
Blomquist raised this point, however, he appreciated neither the inherent value of research and
writing programs to the educational process as a whole, nor the effect of market forces.
Concerning the latter point, economics is a major factor contributing to the emphasis on
research training.  See John J. Costoris, The MacCrate Report:  Of Loaves, Fishes, and Future of
American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 195-96 (1993) (attributing the transformation
of the legal profession into a business to economic pressures and the decreased training
provided by law firms).  Because of the high demand for legal services, law firms began to pay
very large associate salaries.  See Amy Dockser, Companies Rein in Outside Legal Bills:  Tactics
Include Setting Budgets, Soliciting Bills, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1998, at B1 (citing the large increase in
starting associate salaries due to higher legal costs).  In a time of increased budget
consciousness, however, employers tried to maintain their margins of profit by pressuring fewer
associates to produce more work.  See Costoris, supra, at 196 (emphasizing that changing
economic pressures have led firms to cut costs in all areas).  Employers in today’s market can no
longer afford the luxury of giving young attorneys an extended period of on-the-job training or
mentoring.  See id.  Consequently, legal employers seek associates who possess the necessary
skills to practice law from the date of their arrival.  See id. at 171 (asserting that new associates at
some firms receive such high salaries they are expected to produce billable hours immediately).
Indeed, one leading survey of hiring partners in small Chicago firms indicates that 92% of the
partners expected new associates to be proficient in library research, and that 84% demanded
proficiency in online research. See Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the
Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 490 (1993).  In the survey, they asked partners
to identify which skills should be brought to the practice by young attorneys and which should
be developed.  See id. at 472.  The skills which partners listed as most important to bring to
practice, as opposed to those that should be developed within practice include library legal
research (92%), oral communication (91%), written communication (90%), and computer
legal research (84%).  See id. at 490.  The skills listed as the least important were counseling
(9%), the ability to obtain clients (8%), understanding and conducting litigation (6%), and
negotiation (4%).  See id. at 490.
53. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 90 (explaining that due to massive increases in the
amount of material necessary to review in most cases, lawyers viewed the computer as a critical
research tool).
54. See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC., AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:  NARROWING THE GAP, A LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) (studying the necessary
skills that a legal education should provide).
55. See id.  The skill of legal research is defined in surprisingly unambitious terms as
including:  knowledge of the nature of legal rules and institutions; knowledge of and ability to
use the most fundamental tools of legal research; and understanding the process of devising
and implementing a coherent and effective research design.  See id.
Other skills identified as essential were legal analysis, legal reasoning, communication,
problem solving, factual investigation, counseling, negotiation, litigation and alternative dispute
resolution procedures, organization and management of legal work, and recognizing and
solving ethical dilemmas.  See id. at 138-40.
Finally, the report also called upon lawyers to commit themselves to the values of competent
representation, promotion of justice, fairness and morality, improvement of the profession, and
professional self-development. See id. at 140-41.
Another factor that made the legal profession receptive to online
information was the sheer quantity of statutes, decisions, regulations,
and legal scholarship.56  Given the relative weight and concomitant
numeric unmanageability of judicial opinions, mastery of the art of
online research has been deemed necessary for sound legal analysis.57
The first generation of computer technology emerged in the form
of LEXIS and Westlaw legal databases.58  These databases are
accessible through Boolean search logic59 and have become standard
research tools, particularly among younger attorneys.  More recently,
the Internet expanded access to online research capability
worldwide.60  New companies, such as LOIS, offer subscriptions to
                                                       
56. See Berring, supra note 51, at 27 (stating that in 1991 alone, approximately 60,000 cases
were entered into West’s printed reporters, with an additional 40,000 appearing only in
electronic format, totaling approximately 100,000 new decisions each year); see also KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.3, at 6-7 (1994)
(stating that the increasing size and scope of the Federal Government may force reviewing
courts to defer more to the agency decision-making process); see also THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109-31 [hereinafter
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY] (recommending specific reforms of appellate court structure in light
of the continued increase in the number of cases).
57. See Berring, supra note 51, at 16, 28-34; see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 56,
at 109.
58. The two principle commercial database systems in this country are Westlaw and LEXIS.
See Harrington, supra note 37, at 552-55 (tracing the development of LEXIS and Westlaw).  See
generally Jill Abramson et al., West Publishing:  The Empire’s New Clothes, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1984,
at 17 (describing the growth of the West Publishing Company).  Canadian Thomson
Corporation recently purchased Westlaw, along with West Publishing Co.  LEXIS is owned by
Reed/Elsevier.  See generally Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal
Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1107 (1997) (describing how the conglomeration of
companies in the legal information industry has increased the availability of non-legal
information from LEXIS and Westlaw).  LEXIS began formal instruction in American law
schools in the late 1970s, and installed its first terminal at the New York law firm of Shearman &
Sterling in 1973, and Westlaw followed suit two years later.  See Abramson et al., supra, at 19
(discussing the growth of West Publishing Company).
59. “Boolean” searching refers to the process of locating legal information by using a
computer to locate words according to a formula that embodies the principal issues and ideas
related to the research task.  See Robert C. Berring, Full Text Databases and Legal Research:
Backing into the Future, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 28 n.7 (1986) (describing Boolean searches).  See
generally CHRISTOPHER G. WREN & JILL ROBINSON WREN, USING COMPUTERS IN LEGAL RESEARCH:
A GUIDE TO LEXIS AND WESTLAW 44-45 (1994) (describing the logic connectors used in
LEXIS and Westlaw searches).  It is named after British mathematician, George Boole.  See
Marilyn R. Walter, Retaking Control over Teaching of Research, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 569 n.1
(1994) (explaining that LEXIS and Westlaw search strategies are based on “principles of
symbolic logic” elaborated by Boole).
60. A recent study that examined lawyers’ use of the Internet concluded that 72% of legal
professionals use the Internet and of those, about 53% do legal research on it.  See Legal Tech
News Briefs, February/March 1997 (last visited Nov. 24, 1998) (detailing information on the
study) <http://www.internetlawyer.com>; see also Robert C. Berring, Thoughts on the Future:  A
Steroid-Enhanced Editorial, 15 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 1, 3-14 (1996) (predicting that printed
legal materials will become obsolete and that LEXIS and Westlaw will differentiate and
restructure themselves).
One commentator, however, remains unconvinced of the merit of Internet research, noting
that “[i]t is questionable  . . . whether the Internet will long survive in its current form, and it is
impossible to predict what data will stay on it.”  ROBERT C. BERRING, FINDING THE LAW 21 (10th
Internet sites that contain primary authorities for a number of
states.61  Online searches using commercial vendors are also capable
of doing research that would be cumbersome and costly in print
media.62  Seeking factual information about the subject of a case or
transaction, such as a pollutant, a trademark, or an individual, is
especially difficult in print sources.63  Likewise, the ability to search by
segment64 makes it possible to locate easily every opinion by a
particular judge.65
This is not to suggest that the advent of online research is free of
negative consequences.66  First, online research services such as
Westlaw are expensive, especially since associates in law firms often
use electronic research inefficiently.67  Second, and more importantly,
online research generally highlights the factual aspects of a case
rather than broad legal concepts.68  Indeed, to fashion an online
                                                       
ed. 1995).  But see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Why Should Practicing Lawyers Be Interested in the Internet?,
in WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE INTERNET, at 47 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3976, 1996) (providing a
more optimistic view of the Internet’s potential for legal research).
61. See Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition:  Legal Information Transmogrified, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 200 & n.54 (1997) (noting that the Internet-based providers, namely
LOIS, offer lower rates to subscribers).
62. See Bintliff, supra note 3, at 344 (1996) (discussing the ease of online searches).
63. See id. at 345 (comparing print searches with computer searches which allow the
searcher to search for detailed factual situations).
64. See id. at 344.
65. See Berring, supra note 59, at 42 (discussing the new and expanded research
capabilities afforded by full-text electronic databases).
66. Despite some reservations by legal professionals, the use of online information
technologies will greatly increase in the future.  See id. at 27 (describing the increase in online
products and the legal profession’s reception to computers as playing a primary role in legal
research).
67. See Joan S. Howland & Nancy J. Lewis, The Effectiveness of Law School Legal Research
Training Programs, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 387 (1990) (discussing how summer clerks and first-
year associates, although trained in LEXIS and Westlaw while in law school, are unsophisticated
and uneconomical users of the systems).  It may, however, be unfair to pin the cost of online
research on inefficient young lawyers when the problem is attributable to deficient training.  See
Kory D. Staheli, Motivating Law Students to Develop Competent Legal Research Skills:  Combating the
Negative Findings of the Holland & Lewis Survey, 14 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 195, 196 (1994)
(remarking that if the legal research skills of recent graduates is declining, then law school is
partly responsible because legal research training has been reduced).  The difficulties in
training lawyers and law students about cost efficiency often rest with the vendors themselves.
See Walter, supra note 59, at 569.  In most law schools, online training is provided by
representatives of LEXIS and Westlaw, who are obviously motivated to emphasize the strengths
of online research.  See id. at 581 (emphasizing that computer-assisted legal research training
should be put back into the hands of law school instructors because LEXIS and Westlaw
representatives have little incentive to focus on economical use of the system).  Additionally, in
my personal experience, Westlaw and LEXIS have flatly refused to provide students with a
statement of what their research would cost under a standard fee agreement, despite the fact
that vendors have the software available and routinely provide search cost information to law
firms.
68. See Bintliff, supra note 3, at 339, 346 (noting that the information in legal databases is
organized by words making fact-based searches easier than concept-based searches and leading
to a different method of thinking about legal problems).
search request around legal concepts produces an unusable
aggregate of cases.69  At the same time, because English words have
many synonyms and shades of meaning, online searches inevitably
miss substantial numbers of useful cases.70  One extensive study in the
mid-1980s revealed that even well-crafted searches find only twenty
percent of the relevant cases.71  As Professor Robert Berring observed,
online searches are better at finding “words than wisdom.”72  The ease
of logging in from a home or office terminal, without having to go to
the library, often tempts the lawyer to define a problem as one best
researched online.  Lawyers also all too frequently focus on a limited
line of authorities that uses similar language or facts and overlook
creative arguments based on analogies to broader lines of reasoning.73
The process of weighing and balancing authorities becomes distorted
in the absence of an enlightened, broad perspective.74
Print sources also have distinguishing markers that are helpful in
the reasoning process.  Although we may not be consciously aware of
it, when we pull out a bound volume of United States Reports and turn
the pages, we are influenced by the very nature of the compilation to
pay attention to the source.75  By contrast, all bits of information look
alike when presented online.76
                                                       
69. See id. at 346 (discussing how online research is ineffective when searching for concepts
and rules).
70. See Berring, supra note 59, at 38-39 n.38 (describing the inability of the computer to
search for synonyms of search terms).
71. See id. at 43 (discussing the results of a study testing the effectiveness of electronic
research and noting the virtual impossibility of crafting searches that are both complete and
sufficiently precise to yield even a still unacceptable figure of 40 percent of relevant cases).  See
id. (citing David Blair & M.E. Maron, An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for Full-Text Document
Retrieval Systems, 28 COM. ACM 289 (1985)).
72. Id. at 46 (explaining how the inexactness of language hampers computer searches).
73. Even the most enthusiastic advocates of law and technology recognize the effects of
changes in information technology on our cognitive processes.  As M. Ethan Katsh observed:
A new information environment infiltrates our minds as well as our activities, although
changes in thought and orientation occur more slowly and less noticeably than
changes in behavior.  At some point, we not only are presented with information in a
new form but begin thinking about information differently because we acclimate
ourselves to the new form.  Thus, as electronic modes of information acquisition
become commonplace, not only do we become able to obtain information about
distant places but we stop thinking about distance and begin not to think of
information as being in distant places.  The concept and relevancy of distance change,
and expectations and perspectives change.
M. Ethan Katsh, Law Reviews and the Migration to Cyberspace, 29 AKRON L. REV. 115, 121 (1996).
74. See Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World:  Computer Networks in Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV.
403, 483 (1993) (citing Virginia Wise, Managing Information Inflation, in EXPERT VIEWS ON
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LEGAL RESEARCH EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (West
Publishing Co. ed., 1992) (noting that computer research hinders researchers’ ability to
distinguish between sources )).
75. See id. at 460 (observing that as print users pull books off the shelves, looking in
indexes, and turning pages, they see and feel the progress made towards their search objective).
76. This aspect of online research was raised by Gertrude Himmelfarb in a recent essay:
Nevertheless, assuming adequate training and good judgment on
the part of the researcher, the increased access to information
provided by online services can improve the quality of lawyering.77
On balance, the benefits of online research appear to outweigh its
drawbacks.  The computer has been a democratizing force within the
profession because it provides access to such a wide array of materials
that have never before been available to the majority of
practitioners.78  The computer has ended the myth that a
sophisticated practice is only possible in urban areas79 and facilitated
the globalization of legal practice.80
Advances in technology have also improved communication within
the profession, both inside the law office as well as with co-counsel,
opposing counsel and clients.81  It is possible to join multiple
                                                       
I am of two minds about the new electronic revolution.  Like a great many revolutions,
it is salutary-up to a point.  But, like most revolutions, it tends to go beyond that point.
The democratization of knowledge is all to the good, if that means the
democratization of access to knowledge.  Anyone who spends a fair amount of time in
the library is grateful for a computerized catalogue that gives information not only
about the books and journals in that particular library but in all the libraries in the
area or even in the county.  And anyone who does not have access to a major research
library, or who seeks information about a public figure or event in the recent past, or
who wants to read or reread a particular book review or article, will be grateful to the
Internet for retrieving that information quickly and efficiently.
But democratization of the access to knowledge should not be confused with the
democratization of the knowledge itself.  And this is where the Internet, or any system
of electronic networking, may be misleading and even pernicious.  In cyberspace,
every source seems as authoritative as every other. . . .  The search for a name or
phrase on the Internet will produce a comic strip or advertising slogan as readily as a
quotation from the Bible or Shakespeare.  The Internet is an equal opportunity
resource; it recognizes no rank or status or privilege.  In that democratic universe, all
sources, all ideas, all theories seem equally valid and pertinent.
It takes a discriminating mind, a mind that is already stocked with knowledge and
trained in critical discernment, to distinguish between Peanuts and Shakespeare–
between the trivial and the important, the ephemeral and the enduring, the true and
the false.  It is just this sense of discrimination that the humanities have traditionally
cultivated and that they must now cultivate even more strenuously if the electronic
revolution is to do more good than bad.
Gertrude Himmelfarb, Revolution in the Library, AMERICAN  SCHOLAR, Spring 1997, at 197, 199-
200.
77. See Berring, supra note 59, at 41-43 (discussing the advantages and efficiencies of
electronic research over that of the Digest System).
78. See Katsh, supra note 74, at 480 (noting that electronic databases provide a broader
source of information for users than print libraries).
79. Robin Widdison, Electronic Law Practice:  An Exercise in Legal Futurology, 60 MOD. L. REV.
143, 145 (1997) (discussing how information technology is moving the legal field from a
workplace centered labor towards flexible, home-based employment and self-employment);
Himmelfarb, supra note 76, at 199-200 (discussing the democratizing effect of the electronic
revolution by providing greater access to knowledge).
80. See Widdison, supra note 79, at 144-45 (discussing how information technology has
reduced the importance of physical distance between documents, people and places).
81. Law firms use various models of electronic communication in their law practice.  See
Katsh, supra note 74, at 428-37 (discussing group e-mails using a distribution list, group e-mails
using a central computer, and multiple users individually communicating with another
discussion groups and to seek advice or obtain information from
lawyers around the world.82  One proponent of technology even
suggested that within twenty-five years, technology will fragment the
profession and result in a dominance of sole practitioners.83  When
necessary, these practitioners will be able to form ad hoc firms with
other lawyers to work on complex matters.  The judicial process may
also dematerialize into one that employs videoconferencing and e-
mail, rather than a gathering of judges, lawyers, and witnesses.84
Moreover, computers and networks in law schools facilitate
communication among teachers and students, allowing productive
discussion to continue outside the classroom, and empowering
otherwise reticent students to express themselves and develop
confidence in their analytical abilities.85  Many teachers have noted
that creating a course website or mailing list enables students who are
hesitant to speak in class to engage in open discussion with the
professor.86  This is particularly important when the reluctance to
speak is attributable to the student using English as a second
language (a frequent concern with LL.M. students), or when a
student fears disparagement of the views he or she expresses.87  In
such circumstances, the remote character of online communication
may create a voice for the student.88
E-mail does, however, have its costs.  Lawyers often express concern
that their clients tend to expect immediate answers from this medium
of instant communication.  As a result, attorneys are making less
thoughtful evaluations in order to respond quickly to requests for
advice.  In addition, e-mail communications depersonalize the
workplace because they often replace verbal communications among
attorneys in the firm.89
                                                       
computer to retrieve information).
82. See Conference Proceedings:  The Development and Practice of the Law in the Age of the Internet,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 327, 343 (1996) (remarks of John M. Kuttler, Senior Manager, Price
Waterhouse Law Firm and Law Services Group, Washington, D.C. office) (discussing the
availability of electronic newsgroups).
83. See Widdison, supra note 79, at 152.
84. See id. at 151-60.
85. See Robert H. Thomas, “Hey, Did You Get My E-Mail?”  Reflections of a Retro-Grouch in the
Computer Age of Legal Education, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 233, 238 (1994) (describing the use of e-mail
in facilitating communication between teachers and students).
86. See id. at 240 (noting that certain students may be more willing to communicate by e-
mail than in a classroom with its oppressive social climate).
87. See id. at 241 (noting that students who prefer written work to oral communication may
prefer e-mail discussions over classroom discussions, because e-mail provides a better
opportunity for reflection and careful choice of words).
88. See id. at 240 (noting the egalitarian nature of e-mail communication).
89. See Thomas, supra note 85, at 244 (discussing the physically and socially isolating
qualities of e-mail).
Word processing is a form of technology that has become
inherently intertwined with the way lawyers write.  It makes the
editing process infinitely easier and permits lawyers to produce
multiple drafts that refine and improve the analysis of their writings.90
On the other hand, the tendency to edit screen by screen rather than
from a printed copy may discourage the major structural and
organizational changes that can improve a work product.91  The ease
of writing with a computer may also foster verbosity, with the result
that lawyers frequently need to edit their work product more
substantially than previously required.92
Finally, using electronic media can energize presentations.93  In the
law school classroom, using multi-media such as videotapes,
teleconferencing, or animated portrayals can enliven a presentation.94
                                                       
90. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Of Painters, Sculptors, Quill Pens, and Microchips:  Teaching Legal
Writers in the Electronic Age, 75 NEB. L. REV. 802, 805 (1996) (comparing modern legal writing to
sculpting in which lawyers take large quantities of material, editing and whittling away to create
a finished product).
91. See id. at 817 (discussing the benefits to editing documents from a hard copy over
editing text on screen).  See generally Suzanne Ehrenberg, Legal Writing Unplugged:  Evaluating the
Role of Computer Technology in Legal Writing Pedagogy, 4 LEGAL WRITING 1, 5 (1998).
92. As one judge observed:
In recent years, we have witnessed great technological advances in the methods of
reproduction of the written word. . . .  Too often this progress is merely viewed as a
license to substitute volume for logic in an apparent attempt to overwhelm the courts,
as though quantity, and not quality, was the virtue to be extolled.
TOM GOLDSTEIN & JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO WRITING WELL 63 (1991)
(quoting New York Court of Appeals Judge Mathew Jasen after receiving a 284 page brief).
Another observer protested that,
the ease of word processing has generated a barrage of paper.  American lawyers
bombard each other with lengthy memoranda, attachments and appendices.  The
miracle of word processing has also turned many lawyers into mere technicians. . . .
Due to word processing, some documents which were formally individualized are
recycled from case to case and client to client . . . .
Mary Frances Edwards, Academic Director, National Judical College, Are Lawyers Becoming
Illiterate? 6 (June 1987) (unpublished manuscript disseminated to the International Bar
Association Section on General Practice, Committee on Legal Education, Montreux, Switz.) ; see
also LITERACY AND COMPUTERS:  THE COMPLICATIONS OF TEACHING AND LEARNING WITH
TECHNOLOGY (Cynthia L. Selfe & Susan Hilligoss eds., 1994) (collecting essays on writing and
computers); Elizabeth Klem & Charles Moran, Computers and Instructional Strategies in the
Teaching of Writing, in EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON COMPUTERS AND COMPOSITION STUDIES:
QUESTIONS FOR THE 1990S 132-45 (Gail E. Hawisher & Cynthia L. Selfe eds., 1991) (providing
interdisciplinary perspectives on writing and computers); NOEL WILLIAMS, THE COMPUTER, THE
WRITER AND THE LEARNER 3 (1991) (outlining the beneficial and detrimental effects of
computers on writing); Edward Mendelson, How Computers Can Damage Your Prose, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 22, 1991, at 28 (noting that the mechanics of writing on a
computer damage a writer’s logic and style).
93. See Ronald W. Staudt, Does Grandmother Come with It?:  Teaching and Practicing Law in the
21st Century, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 499, 511 (1994) (concluding that the use of computers in
an experimental computer law class provided innovative and interactive ways of teaching
substantive law which students found enjoyable).
94. Even in these cases, however, technology is not necessarily as effective as non-
technological methods.  For example, one of my colleagues, Professor Marc Kadish, regularly
uses a short drama featuring volunteer professional actors to illustrate points in his evidence
Even something as simple as highlighting critical passages may help
in structuring and organizing the information.95
In the courtroom, a wide range of technology helps juries and
judges better understand what actually happened at the time of an
accident or the difference between inventions in a patent case.96  All
of these tools are useful.  Lawyers should and do use them, and law
schools should teach students to master them.  Indeed, the good law
schools already do.97  For many reasons, the marriage of law and
technology seems beneficial.  Being “high-tech” became a hallmark of
the forward-looking and creative individual or institution.  Such uses
are beneficial, however, only if they accomplish a purpose.  Simply
employing technology for its own sake may be the hallmark of a
lemming.
II. THE COMPUTERIZED PROFESSION AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE LAW
Given the profession’s history with technology, it was a short step
from using technology to find the law and using it to learn and work
with the law.  Some now argue that all legal information should be
paperless and that both legal education and the lawyer’s life-long
process of self-education and practice should be based upon online
texts.98  What is troubling is that there is little discussion of whether
and why computer-based instruction enhances learning.  In
discussing this question, I use the term “computer-based instruction”
to refer to the model of learning that is currently being marketed in
law schools and the profession, specifically legal materials provided
on a hypertext database, coupled with the encouragement that
students and lawyers use laptops and databases to organize
information.  In some instances, the experience is also one of
distance learning, where the professor is accessible only by
                                                       
class.  What is important in all of these instances is not that technology is per se beneficial, but
that teachers can help students focus by varying their teaching methods and reaching students
with visual props.
95. See Wanda McDavid, Microsoft PowerPoint:  A Powerful Training Tool, in 5 PERSPECTIVES:
TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 59 (Winter 1997) (discussing the flexibility that Power
Point provides in creating effective presentations).
96. See Mark A. Dombroff, Demonstrative Evidence and Its Effective Use in Aviation Litigation, in
GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 311-12, 338-39 (PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 312, 1986) (discussing the illustrative use of computer reconstruction in
aviation litigation).
97. See, e.g., Staudt supra note 93, at 506-07 (discussing Chicago-Kent College of Law’s
experimental computer law class which taught students torts, criminal law, evidence, and other
substantive law fields).
98. See id. at 502 (analogizing the enhanced learning of children through electronic story-
books to the enhanced learning of law students through interactive, electronic teaching
programs); see also Ronald W. Staudt, An Essay on Electronic Casebooks:  My Pursuit of the Paperless
Chase, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 303 (1992) (discussing the creation of an electronic casebook).
computer.99  Although I draw the examples that follow from the
academy, my observations about the impact of electronic formats
appear to apply equally to work performed by lawyers and judges.
A. The Faces of Cyber-Prof
Most computer-based instruction initially occurred in the context
of interactive technologies designed to help students learn science
and math.100  Subsequently, use of this technology has expanded into
new disciplines.  Graduate business students at Duke University, the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of
Phoenix now all have remote access programs that allow students to
attend classes and work on joint projects from their homes and
offices.101  The University of Greenwich uses electronics to teach an
                                                       
99. Distance learning courses may emphasize either synchronous or asynchronous
learning.  For a sample of asynchronous and synchronous teaching-learning opportunities in a
long-distance setting, see Asynchronous & Synchronous Teaching-Learning Opportunities (visited
Feb. 1, 1999) <http://stc.itec.suny.edu/west/asl.html>.  In synchronous learning, students log
on together with a professor at a specific time and engage in electronic discussion.  See id.  This
is the form of online learning that most closely approximates the traditional classroom.  See id.
The alternative structure, asynchronous learning, allows students to access course materials and
lectures at times that are convenient for them.  See id.  This is more analogous to the
correspondence school of the past.  Other instructional tools, such as online discussion groups,
power point presentations, video clips, and electronic simulations are also made possible by
technology.  However, they largely represent variations of traditional teaching tools, which
supplement rather than alter a teaching method and are not the subject of my concern.
100. For example, the New American Schools Development Corporation (NASDC) recently
awarded $50 million in grants in large part to improve the dismal standing of American
students in these disciplines.  See Arthur Fisher, Crisis in Education:  Part 3, POPULAR SCI., Oct.
1992, at 68 (discussing the use of interactive technology to improve the math and science skills
of students).  In one program, Carnegie Mellon set up an interactive tutoring program in
physics that improved grades from 30% to 80%.  See id. Linda Roberts of the Office of
Technology Assessment’s Science, Education, and Transportation Program emphasized that,
In the teaching of math and science, technology brings new resources into the
classroom.  Students measure acid rain, track the effects of recycling household trash,
and take part in a simulated mission to outer space.  Technology offers enormous
potential for attracting more students to science.  This is because it actually enables
them to “do science”—gather data, participate in experiments, work out hypotheses,
and interpret findings.
Id. at 94.
101. See Barbara Sullivan, On-the-run Students Log On to On-line Degree Programs, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 1 (discussing the use of interactive technology to improve the math and
science skills of students).  The University of Phoenix offers four graduate and five
undergraduate degrees in the computer format to a total of 2,000 students.  See id.  Some
residency is required for an undergraduate degree, but graduate students “never enter the
classroom.”  See id.  The program uses synchronous learning, and individual classes are kept to a
maximum of 13 students each to establish a personal atmosphere, even in interactive online
discussion groups.  See id.
The online nature of the courses has not reduced the cost.  Tuition for a two and a half-year
program at the University of Phoenix is $20,000.  See id.  The cost of Duke University’s 19
month program, entitled Global Executive Master’s in Business Administration, or GEMBA, is
$79,500, including 15 weeks in residence on the Duke campus.  See id.
economics course.102  One of the most creative approaches is a history
program used at Stanford University that enables students to
experience the past by playing a computer game in which they act as
French landowners who must make a variety of decisions about how
to influence court officials and make investments.103
In 1983, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”)
launched Project Athena, a computer project labeled by then-
President Paul Gray as “the largest step forward in MIT’s long history
of contributions to education.”104  Athena was designed to
computerize the learning process and to provide a broad range of
services, including electronic instruction, computer communications,
and modeling hardware for some of the most sophisticated
engineering programs in the country.105  Western Governors
University plans to institute the most far reaching program:  a virtual
campus in which all instruction is delivered via CD-ROM, computer,
television, or interactive video.106
Legal education has also experienced an increased fascination with
computer-based instruction.107  The first applications emerged as
interactive programs designed to drill those areas of law where, as in
applied math and science, rules and answers exist.108  The Center for
Computer Assisted Legal Instruction (“CALI”) did much of this
pioneering work,109 promulgating exercises in fields pervasively
regulated by statute including evidence, corporations, civil
                                                       
102. See ALAN FREEMAN ET AL., RESOURCE-BASED PRESENTATION OF AN INTRODUCTORY
ECONOMICS UNIT 8-9 (1995) (providing a description of the University of Greenwich program).
103. See Andrew Pollack, Computer Programs as University Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1987, at
A1 (describing Stanford’s course development efforts which provide students with
opportunities through various computer simulations to facilitate learning of certain subjects).
104. See Richard Saltus, Athena Didn’t Revolutionize MIT, But It’s Here To Stay:  $100M Project
Still Short of Promise But for Many It’s Indispensable, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1991, at 25 (providing
an overview of the advantages of the experiment while at the same time noting problems such
as the lack of interest by a large number of faculty).
105. See id. at 29.
106. See Karen Brandon, “Virtual University” Appears Well on Its Way to Becoming Virtual Reality,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1996, at 6 (explaining the framework of a virtual university where the
traditional classroom is replaced by technology with the advantages of increasing accessibility to
education and the possible restrictions of less social interaction).
107. See Michael A. Geist, Where Can You Go Today?  The Computerization of Legal Education
from Workbooks to the Web, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 141, 149-50 (1997) (noting that until the 1980s,
computers received little attention in the legal classroom, but that the accessibility of the
Internet has introduced new opportunities for both students and teachers).
108. See id. at 149-50 (detailing the early efforts of law school professors to create step-by-
step computer programs).
109. See id. at 150-51 (discussing the establishment and growth of CALI and its four main
computer programs which built on the initial efforts of the University of Michigan Law School
and Harvard Law School).  CALI now offers more than 100 exercises in 21 different areas of the
law. See Center for Computer Assisted Legal Education (last modified Sept. 26, 1996)
<http://www.cali.org.calitech.geninfo.html> [hereinafter CALI].
procedure, and the Superfund.110  Other institutions have engaged in
similar projects designed to help students test their knowledge and
reasoning ability.111  Indeed, as early as the mid-1970s, Professor
Roger Park of the University of Minnesota Law School developed a
program that incorporated hypothetical fact situations and asked
students to evaluate the application of evidentiary rules relating to
hearsay and character.112  For his torts class, Professor Robert Keeton
of Harvard Law School developed several computer lessons that were
designed to help students analyze various issues in the context of
specific cases.113
A more current example is the Electronic Learning or “E-Learn”
project at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.114  All students selected for the project are required to
own laptop computers.115  The students receive materials in print as
well as in infobase formats through a program on a Folio VIEWS
software platform called The Law Student’s Desktop.116  The software has
features which allow students to conduct searches using Boolean
                                                       
110. See CALI, supra note 109; see also Geist, supra note 107, at 141 (surveying the uses of
technology by CALI and others).  Geist characterizes CALI’s activities as falling into four
categories:
First, there are memory drills, which are short questions requiring a yes or no answer.
Second, there are tutorials, which present a greater degree of information and allow
students to branch off in different directions.  Third, there are simulation exercises,
which attempt to recreate real life situations and require that students assume a
certain role within the situation.  Fourth, there are games, which are similar to
simulations but involve a competitive element with several students participating at the
same time.
Id. at 151.
111. See Geist, supra note 107, at 151-52 (noting the existence of computer-assisted legal
education projects created internationally such as the British and Irish Legal Educational
Technology Association (“BILETA”), a Canadian income tax program, and an Australian
hypercard project).
112. See Roger Park, How Can the Law Professor Best Use Computer-aided Exercises?, in TEACHING
LAW WITH COMPUTERS:  A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, 13, 19 (Westview Press No. 2, 1979)
(analyzing a University of Minnesota Law School computer program on evidence).
113. See Robert E. Keeton, How Do Computer-aided Exercises in Law Work?, in TEACHING LAW
WITH COMPUTERS:  A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 27, 27-39 (Westview Press No. 2, 1979) (presenting
examples of tort questions on a computer program in which the computer responds to simple
one-word answers).
114. See Richard A. Matasar & Rosemary Shiels, Electronic Law Students:  Repercussions in Legal
Education, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 909, 913 (1995) (discussing a general history of the Chicago-Kent
computer development).  The project began with a group of 32 volunteer students during the
1994-95 academic year, and was expanded the following year to include a full first-year section,
also composed of volunteer students.  See id. at 927; see also Richard Warner, Teaching
Electronically:  The Chicago-Kent Experiment, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 383, 389 (1997) (discussing
how Chicago-Kent designed its project of incorporating electronic materials into a legal
education).
115. See Matasar & Shiels, supra note 114, at 927.
116. See id. at 924 (explaining the computer features available to law students for analyzing,
retrieving, and comprehending material).
logic and to cut and paste text.117  Another important feature is the
hypertext link capability across files that enables students to access
deeper levels of information with the click of a mouse.118  Thus,
students who want to read the full text of an opinion rather than the
edited version that appears in the electronic casebook, may jump
through a pre-embedded link into the original text.119  Likewise,
electronic texts give students the ability to jump into explanatory,
illustrative, or additional material.120
A second initiative was a telecommunications course taught to
students at both the California Western and Cleveland Marshall
schools of law.121  This course supplemented live, in-class sessions with
electronic media such as the Internet, videotapes, videoconferencing,
and an electronic casebook.122
In another initiative, LEXIS-NEXIS commissioned seven professors
at Harvard to create a curriculum for legal analysis, research, writing,
and argument keyed to first year courses such as property and torts.123
                                                       
117. See id. at 920 (describing the electronic casebook tools which combine traditional
teaching techniques with computer technology).  For example, the course materials are
entered in such a way as to give the student the ability to retrieve text in a variety of formats to
facilitate outlining.  See id.  Such capacity includes retrieving the table of contents, retrieving
highlighted portions of the text, inserting student notes into the text, or all of the above.  See id.
at 923-25.  The Infobase Manager Manual distributed with version 3.1a recites the “key
definitions” as including links, notes, and shadow files.  See FolioVIEWS, 3.1a Infobase Manager,
in FolioVIEWS, Infobase Production Kit (on file with the author).  The utilities loaded on the
system include “chop and load,” “create and extract,” “editlex,” and “fixlink.”  See id.
118. See Matasar & Shiels, supra note 114, at 920, 922 (explaining that the hypertext feature
is a tool for students to link information within one law subject or to combine subject areas to
build individual conceptual models of the law).
119. See id. at 923 (noting the many additional resources made available to students through
hypertext).
120. See id. at 922.  Infobase technology, of course, is also useful for traditional tasks.  See id.
at 18 (discussing how computers may improve briefing and outlining abilities).  For example, it
works in tandem with information technology by giving students the capability to organize and
manage the results of their electronic researching.  See id.  Thus, the technology creates a strong
bias in favor of online media over print materials.
The software also contains other features, such as colored coded highlighters, for
emphasizing key facts or key quotes, a “notes” feature, which enables students to add notes and
comments anywhere in the infobase, and the ability to use the infobase to import and store
electronic research from the LEXIS database.  See id. at 924-26.
121. See Andrea L. Johnson, Distance Learning and Technology in Legal Education:  A 21st
Century Experiment, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213, 214-46 (1997) (discussing the format and
findings of an electronically connected class which linked Cleveland Marshall College of Law
and California Western Law School).
122. See id. at 215 (describing how student-to-student and student-to-teacher contacts are
made through different electronic media).
123. See Amy Hession, Team Creates Electronic Law-School Materials, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 12, 1996, at A21 (assessing the new LEXIS program for first-year students and videotaped
lectures and online discussions, assignments, and research); Chris Klein, 1Ls in Cyberspace:
Harvard Joins Race to Create a Virtual Classroom, NAT. L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A18 (discussing the
recent programs at Harvard, Chicago-Kent, and Cornell which restructure traditional learning
tools through the use of a common computer network).
According to one report on the project, “[a] long-term goal is to
develop a curriculum that will replace standard courses completely
and combine areas of law for study.”124  Harvard officials characterized
the program differently.125  Associate Deans Todd Rakoff and Frank
E.A. Sander wrote to the editors of the Harvard Law Record that,
“[t]he goal, as regards new technology, is to use it where it furthers
understanding, not to insert it into the curriculum for its own sake.”126
These examples of electronic courses demonstrate the dedication
and substantial effort of the professors who have utilized these new
technologies.  Yet with such effort and emphasis on integrating
technology, one question remains:  Does it work?
B. Evidence of Cyber-Prof’s Effectiveness
Despite the en vogue discussion within the academy about the
benefits of expanding computer-based instruction, there is little
evidence demonstrating that the benefits justify the costs.127  The
profession is being wooed by the siren song that any tool that enables
us to do things faster allows us to do them better.128
Actual evidence of the effectiveness of computer-based instruction
is in short supply.  Mark Shields, a sociologist at the University of
Virginia, characterized the claims of “techno-utopianism” as dubious,
and lamented that “the pedagogical vision is blind, and technological
modernization has become an end in itself.”129  Even though there
have been studies concluding that computers improve test scores,130 a
1991 study reporting favorably on computer-based instruction
contained three broad findings that should give any professor or
practitioner pause.131
First, the shorter the time period of computer-based instruction, the
                                                       
124. Hession, supra note 123, at A21.
125. See Todd D. Rakoff & Frank E. A. Sander, Letter to the Editor, Professors, NOT HLS,
Have “Bridge” Contract with Lexis-Nexis, HARV. L. REC., Oct. 18, 1996, at 6 (emphasizing the
experimental aspects of the LEXIS program and the fact that Harvard does not have a contract
with LEXIS).
126. Id.  Interestingly, several of the major legal publishers, including West and Aspen
(formerly Little Brown) offered traditional core courses utilizing many of these same features.
Notably, both West and Aspen have cut their offerings due to a lack of demand.  Interviews with
Eileen Breitbart, Aspen Publishing, & Bonnie Karlen, Westlaw Representative (February 1998).
127. Cf.  Shields, supra note 15, at 30 (concluding that electronic mail and word processing
are the only computer tools used consistently by a majority of the faculty, many of whom remain
skeptical about benefits of computer-based teaching methods).
128. A cynic might also speculate that one reason the siren song is so seductive is that
lawyers have come to equate doing things faster with making more money.
129. Shields, supra note 15, at 31-32.
130. See id. at 30 (stating that 95% of the studies are based mainly on test scores).
131. See Chen-Lin C. Kulik & James Kulik, Effectiveness of Computer-Based Instruction:  An
Updated Analysis, 7 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1991).
greater its benefits.132  Thus, while computers may prove useful in
drilling discrete subject matter, they are less useful in teaching an
overarching concept.  As a result, computerized formats for texts and
documents may not be suited to the complexities of legal analysis.
Second, most of the benefits of computer-based instruction were
assessed by comparing courses taught by two different professors,
where one professor had used computer-based instruction and the
other had used more conventional methods.133  Therefore, as Shields
maintained, the differences in the test scores could have been
attributable not to the method itself, but to the enthusiasm of an
energetic instructor responding to a new challenge.
Finally, despite the arrival of superior technologies, the benefits of
computer-based instruction have not shown a corresponding
improvement over the last decade.134  Indeed, most of the academic
uses of technology today remain limited.135  As Shields observed:
“There’s little basis for believing that computers have helped to alter,
let alone transform, the cognitive intellectual capabilities students
need to develop, . . . nor that they help nurture the ethical
sensibilities which prepare students for responsible lives in civil
society.”136
Consistently, some recent studies suggest that the investment of
money and time in technology is often unwarranted because
computers do not enhance learning and working processes.137  For
example, despite the $100 million dollar investment in MIT’s Project
Athena, the head of a committee which reviewed the project
concluded that over the long term, only 200 of MIT’s 1,500 course
offerings were influenced at all by the project, and that of those only
ten “were touched in a deep and successful way.”138  A recent article in
The Atlantic Monthly described a carefully monitored study at the
                                                       




136. Id.  Shields is not alone in his concern that the benefits of computer-based instruction
may have been fundamentally overstated.  For example, in the computer-based presentation of
economics at the University of Greenwich, while 79% of the students said that they found the
technology to be useful and flexible, 94% indicated a strong preference for “more structured,
tutor-led, didactic activity in the form of lectures.”  See FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 8
(assessing a pilot project including innovations such as team teaching and computer programs
to evaluate student performance).
137. See Todd Oppenheimer, The Computer Delusion, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1997, at 45, 53
(referring to various findings that highlight the potentially damaging effects of computer-based
instruction on children’s development such as an inability to link different ideas or being able
to utilize only left-brain sequential thinking rather than right-brain processing of different kinds
of information simultaneously).
138. See Saltus, supra note 104, at 25-29.
elementary school level which demonstrated that a computer-assisted
reading program caused a fifty percent drop in creativity.139  As the
author observed, “after 49 students used the program for seven
months, they could no longer answer open-ended questions and
showed a markedly diminished ability to brainstorm with fluency and
originality.”140  Jane Healy, a professor of education at Stanford
University, noted that although the motion picture, the radio, and
teaching machines were also all hailed as technologies that would
revolutionize education, none accomplished this task.141  She wrote
that computers, which primarily encourage visual stimulation, are
probably not stimulating the primary access routes to reasoning.142
She also observed that computerized learning tends to “flatten”
information into sequential data, exercises only the left brain, and
provides much less stimulation to the right brain, where the
simultaneous processing of different types of analysis that is intrinsic
to creative thought occurs.143  Anirudh Dhebar of the Harvard
Business School observed that “the ease, economy and speed with
which computers and increasingly sophisticated software allow us to
cut and paste, calculate, format, graph and act are making a mockery
of a creative and nourishing act:  the thinking process.”144
Although these observations sound extreme, they raise questions
regarding both the utility of the computer as a learning tool,145 and
the extent to which computer algorithms are suitable tools in the
study of law.146  To the extent that computer-based instruction
encourages a “quick reading for rules” approach to the study of law,
                                                       
139. See Oppenheimer, supra note 137, at 52 (discussing the general failure of computer
reading programs to provide educational benefits to children).
140. Id.
141. See LARRY CUBAN, TEACHERS AND MACHINES:  THE CLASSROOM USE OF TECHNOLOGY
SINCE 1920, at 109 (1986).
142. JANE M. HEALY, ENDANGERED MINDS:  WHY OUR CHILDREN DON’T THINK 324-25 (1990)
(analyzing the limited ability of computers to teach sequential exercises while failing to explore
the emotional and creative aspects of a child’s growth and development).
143. See id. at 322-25 (quoting R. Rothman, NAEP Releases Delayed Report on Reading Test,
EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 2, 1988) (discussing the difficulties in relying on computers to teach children
precise reasoning when it does not necessarily come naturally to them).
144. Anirudh Dhebar, Of Thinking Caps and Computer Traps, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at
F13.  Professor Dhebar is careful to point out in the same article that he is not a technophobe.
See id. (promoting the democratizing characteristics of the computer while advocating more
discipline in the use of technology).  Indeed, he teaches marketing, and managing technology
and product change at Harvard.  See id. (describing how he advises students to think through
projects before turning to the computer).
145. See id. (lamenting the loss of discipline, planning, and quality writing with the
introduction of technological tools and easy access to large amounts of information).
146. But see Warner, supra note 114, at 383-86 (outlining four basic goals of legal education
and concluding that computers help achieve these goals mainly through their superiority to
printed materials).
students and lawyers may simply miss the depth that comes with the
goal of appreciating the narrative and rhetoric of law.147  While
infobase technology enables lawyers to access, organize, manage, and
retrieve information in both the classroom and the courtroom, there
are negative effects that may extend to the learning process as a
whole.148
A survey at Chicago-Kent about the E-Learn project revealed that,
while most of the first-year students felt positively about the
experience overall, some students and faculty had concerns relating
to the project’s impact on the learning environment and the ability of
some students to function within it.149  These concerns included the
background noise in the classroom, the added distraction of learning
the technology, or its features, and the tendency of students to
transcribe rather than participate in the class.150
                                                       
147. Narrative and rhetoric do have an impact on the fabric of the law.  See Peter Brooks,
The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES 14, 15 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996) (promoting the importance of rhetoric and narrative in both modern and historical law
perspectives, particularly at trial and in court opinions).  As Peter Brooks observed:
Issues of interpretation, intentionalism, rhetoric, and objectivity have been explored
from various perspectives by such scholars as Richard Posner, Stanley Fish, Ronald
Dworkin, and Owen Fiss; and a number of students in both law and literature are
pursuing work that crosses the borders between the two fields.  More recently, another
kind of intersection of law and literature has gained attention:  the claim that
narrative—storytelling—is a central component of legal practice and thinking.
Id. at 15.
148. See Matasar & Shiels, supra note 114, at 928, 931-32 (recognizing that the benefits of
technology cannot be separated from new challenges such as upgrading libraries, securing staff
support, and providing adequate technological facilities).
149. See PETER W. MARTIN, THE CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, THE CHICAGO-KENT
COMPUTER SECTION 1995-96, at 2, 9 (1996) (on file with the author) (noting that to both
students and faculty these concerns were minimal in the overall success of the program).
150. See id. at 9, 10.  A formal evaluation of the E-Learn Project was conducted by Professor
Peter Martin of Cornell University School.  See id. at 1 (advancing the benefits of using
computer tools to teach law students in addition to traditional printed text following a year’s
study of the experimental program).  His conclusions were based in part on observations, and
in part on a survey of 68 of the 100 students participating in the project.  See id. at 2, attachment
1.  Professor Martin defined the goal of his study as follows:
Does such a substantial shift in the technology available to students for their use in
performing the standard range of tasks put before them in the first year of law study
make a difference?  If so, in what ways?  What are the gains, tradeoffs, surprises and
problems associated with the pervasive use of computers that . . . hold a
comprehensive set of course materials?
Id. at 1.  Martin’s survey demonstrated that only 10% of the students used the new learning
environment in what Martin described as the pure form, i.e., they took notes and even read
assignments in the FOLIO environment.  See id. at 3, 4.  Another 10% abandoned the project
and used FOLIO only to organize online research.  See id. at 4.  Most students fell into a middle
group, who made substantial use of the laptop computer, but deviated in significant ways from
the parameters of the experiment.  See id.  For example, most read their assignments in print
form, and referred to print materials during class discussion.  See id.  Likewise, where class
discussion centered on a particular passage of text in a statute or opinion, students preferred to
read the print copy.  See id.  Where, however, the course materials were specifically designed
around the electronic format, such as the Contracts section with interactive exercises and
tutorials, students were, both by attraction and compulsion, drawn into the E-Learn
There was also a consensus that simply taking printed text and
putting it into an infobase environment did not benefit learning.151
This is not to suggest that the project had no merit.  In those classes
where professors were proficient at using the technology,152 both
faculty and students found it helpful to be able to draw attention to
key passages, to pose hypotheticals electronically, or to record and
evaluate varying responses to a problem.153  One must ask, however,
whether these benefits justified requiring every student to buy a
laptop computer and asking the faculty to devote time to
incorporating technology into its courses.154  One must also ask
whether the benefits were largely attributable to the time the
professors put into developing the new format for the course.
In view of the expanding uses of legal technology, Paul Teich
reviewed the empirical research which reflected on the efficacy of
computer-assisted instruction at the college level.155  While Teich
favored technology, even his data, provides scant basis for
redesigning legal education.  He relied heavily on one article which
reviewed ninety-nine studies of undergraduate education to conclude
that technology had positive impacts on learning skills.156  On a
preliminary level, twenty-one percent of the studies suggested that
computer-assisted students performed better, seventy-eight percent of
the studies reported no change, and only one study suggested that
they actually performed worse.157  Although these results were not in
and of themselves significant, the authors of the article concluded
that when the underlying data were subjected to statistical “meta-
analysis,” it indicated that computer-assisted instruction enhanced
                                                       
environment.  See id.
With respect to the ability to create outlines, many students correctly believed that ease in
generating an outline was not a benefit.  See id. at 5.  They felt they learned the most from
creating an outline without the software.  See id.  The software, in their view, tended to
encourage a cut and paste approach that did not necessarily foster analysis of the either
individual legal concepts or the relationship between concepts.  See id.
151. See id. at 7 (explaining that the majority of students would choose to have their reading
assignments in print form).
152. See id. at 6 (noting that only one professor was proficient at using the technology).
153. See id. at 6, 7 (noting that more than 80% of the class characterized this technology
method as “particularly effective”).
154. See id. at 7 (noting that although only one professor used a laptop computer in the
classroom, all professors involved in the project were required to give students supplements
online and had to adjust to students taking exams on their computers).
155. Teich, supra note 14, at 492 (concluding that computer-aided teaching methods may
enhance student test scores because students are able to learn more quickly).
156. See id. at 492 (citing James A. Kulik, et al., Effectiveness of Computer-based College Teaching:
A Meta-analysis of Findings, 50 REV. EDUC. RES. 525 (1980) and Chen-Lin C. Kulik & James A.
Kulik, Effectiveness of Computer-Based Education in Colleges, 19 AEDS J. 81 (1986)).
157. See id.
learning by a small, but nevertheless statistically significant degree.158
One wonders why we must turn to the manipulations of “meta-
analysis” to find benefits.  Moreover, the most striking thing about
these evaluations of computer-based instruction is that all of the
existing studies depend on how students viewed the experience.
Students are not necessarily the best judges of their own
performance.  It is possible for a student to have enjoyed technology
without benefiting from its use.  Further, many of the studies cited in
the article involved first-year students, who have little basis for
comparing computer-based instruction with other teaching methods.
Evaluating the effectiveness of technology is also difficult because
the profession generally lacks experience in measuring the
effectiveness of any of the methods used to teach lawyers problem-
solving skills.159  For example, comparisons of the educational benefits
of the Socratic method, the problem method, and the lecture
method fail to demonstrate significant differences.160
                                                       
158. “Meta-analysis” is “a means of integrating and consolidating the results of experiments
in the applied social sciences.”  Id. at 493 n.21 (citing Gene V. Glass, Primary, Secondary, and
Meta-Analysis of Research, 5 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 (1976)).  Teich relates a study in which students
using computer-assisted instruction were assigned to an “experimental” group, while those
using conventional teaching methods were assigned a “control” status.  As Teich observed:
[T]he outcome of each study is converted to a common scale called an “effect size.”
The effect size is equal to the difference between the mean examination score
obtained by all students in all experimental groups in a given study and the mean
score obtained by students in control groups, divided by the standard deviation of the
control group scores . . . .
The investigator completes the meta-analysis by averaging the effect sizes of all the
studies he or she has located to determine, across the set, whether students taught by the
experimental teaching technique perform better or worse than students taught by
other methods, and, if  there is a difference in performance, how great the difference
is.
Id.
The study concluded that the effect of computer-assisted instruction would be an “effect size”
sufficient to move students from the 50th to the 60th percentile in examination scores.  See id.
(discussing a study reported in Chen-Lin C. Kulik & James A. Kulik, Effectiveness of Computer
Based Education in Colleges, 19 AEDS J. 81 (1986)).
159. See Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach:  A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law
Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (“Conscious scrutiny about methods of teaching law is
rare.”).
160. See John D. Blackburn & Edward Niedzwiedz, Do Teaching Methods Matter?  A Field Study
of an Integrative Teaching Technique, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 525, 546-47 (1981) (concluding that student
achievement is not influenced substantially by methodology used); Steven Hartwell & Sherry L.
Hartwell, Teaching Law:  Some Things Socrates Did Not Try, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, 522 (1990)
(concluding that a study comparing essay discussion and quiz learning approaches with a
control group showed only marginal differences in performance); Edward L. Kimball & Larry
C. Farmer, Law School Developments:  Comparative Results of Teaching Evidence in Three Ways, 30 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 196, 208-10 (1979) (determining that the problem method was preferable overall
for teaching evidence, however, there were few performance differences between students on
final exams); Teich, supra note 14, at 491 n.12 (discussing the studies in which no significant
differences between traditional legal education methods were found on examination
performance); Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching:  Is There a Case Against the Case
System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 184 (1986) (discussing numerous experiments comparing law
Therefore, I question whether these findings justify the current
level of technocentrism.  First, a legitimate question exists as to
whether the “meta-analysis” of data from social science courses, which
relies heavily on mean norming,161 applies legitimately in the context
of using computer-based programs to work with legal materials.
Further, both the Teich and E-Lean evaluations ignored the fact that
the students in the control groups were self-selected and already
                                                       
teaching methods and finding that because no conclusive answers were reached, legal
educators need to end their unsubstantiated criticism of opposing teaching methods).
Some argue that the legal academy has abandoned the profession and that it has failed to
prioritize teaching problem-solving skills.  See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (criticizing legal
education for its failure to give students an adequate doctrinal grounding, the necessary legal
skills, or an ethical compass); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession:  A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2217 (1993) (responding to
challenges regarding legal teaching and scholarship).  But see Donald B. Ayer, Stewardship, 91
MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2150 (1993) (articulating the opinion that law schools and law firms are
both losing their sense of stewardship for the law); Lee C. Ballinger, The Mind In the Major
American Law School, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2167, 2169 (1993) (finding Judge Edwards’ view
regarding the debilitating disease of theory to be a fundamental mischaracterization of law
schools today); Derrick K. Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91
MICH. L. REV. 2025, 2027-28 (1993) (defending nontraditional scholarship through a criticism
of Judge Edwards’ analysis as being overbroad); Paul Brest, Plus CA Change, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1945, 1945 (1993) (contending that during the past 30 years legal education has not changed
dramatically); J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response From the Visitor From Another Planet, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1953, 1954-55 (1993) (suggesting that the problems in legal practice stem from racism, sexism
and elitism, rather than lack of ethics, diminishing practice capacity and lack of commitment to
public service as contended by Judge Edwards); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and the
“Middle Ground,” 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075, 2077 (1993) (contending that Judge Edwards’ view of
what the legal profession should look like is distressingly narrow); Sanford Levinson, Judge
Edwards’ Indictment of “Impractical” Scholars:  The Need for A Bill of Particulars, 91 MICH. L. REV.
2163, 2166 (1993) (praising Judge Edwards’ paper as accurate, however, concluding that the
section on professional responsibility should have discussed the solutions that some law schools
are devising to deal with the issue); Louis K. Pollak, The Disjunction Between Judge Edwards and
Professor Priest, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2113, 2113 (1993) (suggesting the legal profession is not in as
distressing shape as Judge Edwards concluded); Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of
Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1928 (1993) (arguing that Judge Edwards’
inability to recognize the value of new legal scholarship is a result of his excessively narrow
propositions); George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure
of the Production of Legal Ideas:  A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1930 (1993)
(applauding the results that an interdisciplinary structure is having on modern law schools);
Paul D. Reingold, Henry Edwards’ Nostalgia, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1998, 2009 (1993) (noting that
clinical legal education could result in the increased use of doctrine, and arguing that this
approach is more positive than Judge Edwards’ critical theory approach); James Boyd White,
Law Teachers’ Writing, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1970 (1993) (rejecting Judge Edwards’
characterization of ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ as a division for legal scholarship); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery:  Bringing Theory, Doctrine and Practice to Life, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1977, 1997 (1993) (finding the disjunction between law schools and the profession is not
caused by theory, as Judge Edwards contends, but actually is caused by the lack of attention paid
to the interplay of theory, doctrine, and practice).
161. See James A. Kulik, et al., Effectiveness of Computer-based College Teaching:  A Meta-analysis
of Findings, 50 REV. EDUC. RES. 525, 527 (1980) (describing meta-analysis methodology as
including the location of studies on a particular issue based on specific procedures, quantitative
and substantive analysis of those studies and use of “multivariate techniques to describe findings
and relate characteristics of the studies to outcomes”).
tended to be more comfortable with computers than the average
student.162  They also ignored the likelihood that these students came
from the ranks of families that were either more affluent and had had
more educational opportunities, or were more oriented toward
expending family resources on education.
Other data raise further questions.  The study evaluating the
computer-based economics course at the University of Greenwich
noted that in all teaching contexts, computers are most effective when
used to supplement rather than to supplant conventional
instructional and learning methods.163  Consistently, some observers
have suggested that when computers are used in a supplementary
role, learning has improved simply because the total time students
have devoted to the subject increased.164
Even more troubling, a recent study at Ohio State University
concluded that using computer-generated slides and visual effects to
present classroom material may actually harm learning.  As the
author of that study concluded:
When a class is taught with the teacher’s lecture notes presented in
a computer slide show, . . . it seems the students feel that all the
authority comes from the computer.  Instead of paying attention to
what the teacher is saying, they just copy down what they see on the
computer screen.  They dissociate themselves from the class and
become passive observers rather than actively participating in the
learning experience.165
In addition, computer exercises are difficult and time-consuming
to devise.166  Incorporating computer instruction often forces a
teacher to devote substantial effort to redefining the objectives of the
course.  Thus, computers alone do not make better teachers; rather
the time and energy required to create computer exercises may
                                                       
162. Concededly, each new class that arrives is progressively more comfortable with
computers.  My point, however, is that the control groups in these studies had a pro-technology
bias.
163. See FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 102, at 22 (stating that the most radical and effective use
of computers involves combining teaching space for computer laboratories and class
discussion).
164. See Paul Hagler & James Knowlton, Invalid Implicit Assumption in CBI Comparison
Research, 14  J. COMPUTER-BASED INSTRUCTION 84, 85 (1987) (reasoning that studies concluding
that computer-based instruction had a positive effect on test scores and learning had more to
do with the increased time spent studying than on the superiority of computer-based learning).
165. Jon Van & Jon Bigness, Research Suggests Those Flashy Computer Slides May Be Stealing the
Show, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 1998, at C2 (quoting Andrea Huff, a lecturer at Ohio State University).
166. See Russell Burris, The Authoring Process and Instructional Design, in TEACHING LAW WITH
COMPUTERS:  A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 43, 49 (Russell Burris et al. eds., 1979) (explaining that
the design of effective computer-aided instruction (“CAI”) programs involves fundamental and
complex considerations of subject matter structure, knowledge and skill, teaching and learning
processes, and technological design).
compel teachers to improve the focus of their instruction.
Finally, many educators can recount anecdotal evidence that
technology may harm the learning process by altering work patterns.
When I teach Civil Procedure, I typically distribute ten sets of “Points
to Remember” throughout the semester to help students define
fundamental terms and concepts and to structure their course
outlines.  Generally, seventy-five to eighty percent of the students
have commented on their class evaluations that they found these
handouts very useful.
One year, I decided to post the “Points” on our law school network
so that students could simply download them into their notes at their
convenience.  I did not distribute hard copies.  In the end, few
students read the “Points” until exam week.  Only three out of one
hundred students mentioned the “Points” at all on their student
evaluations and several complained that they were having trouble
“connecting” concepts.  Several students did mention that they later
accessed the “Points” during reading period, yet the exams results
were the poorest I have ever received.
This experience suggests several things.  First, students do not
access information on the computer to the same degree as they do
with a printed page.  Second, students appear to equate the ability to
access the material with mastery of the material.  They view
downloaded information as learned information.  Third, their failure
to access and to think about the information at the time it was
presented in class may have done more than merely delay their
command of the subject matter; it may have permanently impaired it.
Despite this, however, using more technology is a persistent theme in
both legal education and practice.167
In sum, both law firms and law schools have spent huge sums of
money incorporating technology into the legal environment.  Yet,
there is little evidence that such technology produces higher quality
work product.168
C. Technology and Learning Styles
The learning and working styles of lawyers remain woefully under-
                                                       
167. For example, an upcoming meeting of the Institute for Law Teaching at Gonzaga
University School of Law lists no fewer than seven workshops dedicated to bringing more
technology in the classroom.  See Legal Reference Librarians (visited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://www.ljx.com/public/mailinglists/wwwlawlibref-I/725.html> (summarizing the purpose
of E-Teach and subscription information).
168. See Charles H. Wilson, Planes, Trains and . . . Civility, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 77, 78
(providing anecdotes about how technology has negatively affected work product).
explored.169  Law schools select professors and law firms hire attorneys
based on their performance in law school, but law professors and
lawyers generally have little or no background in cognitive learning
or education theory.  Although a complex psychological analysis is
beyond the scope of this Essay, even a cursory review of the learning
theory literature raises concerns about whether computer-based
instruction improves the learning process.  First, consider the general
processes of learning and thinking.  At the most basic levels, these
processes involve:  (a) receiving and encoding; (b) remembrance,
categorization, and retrieval; (c) judgment and choice; and (d) the
intricate thought processes required for solving complex problems.170
The question for lawyers and law professors concerned about
learning and teaching ever-increasing amounts of information is how
computer-based instruction may positively or negatively affect our
ability to perform at each of the stages mentioned above.
The first process, receiving and encoding, has a profound impact
on the way that students will be able to remember, retrieve, and
evaluate information.171  It is also the aspect of legal study that may be
most affected by working with materials in an electronic format.
Mary Potter, a behavioral psychologist at MIT, explained that shallow
reception and encoding means that information and ideas are easily
forgotten, and will not have a long term impact on the thinking
process.172  A number of factors may influence the extent to which
information is deeply encoded.  For example, we deeply encode
when we receive information with an awareness that it is important or
when the information is surprising.173  Memories are linked or
connected either by the frequency with which they are associated, or
by temporal contiguity.174  As Professor Potter observed:  “Things that
                                                       
169. There have been, however, some recent studies on how lawyers and law students read.
See Dorothy H. Deegan, Exploring Individual Differences Among Novice Readers in a Specific Domain:
The Case of Law, 30 READING RES. Q. 154, 161 (1995); Mary A. Lundberg, Metacognitive Aspects of
Reading Comprehension:  Studying Understanding in Legal Case Analysis, 22 READING RES. Q. 407,
417-32 (1987).
170. See Mary C. Potter, Remembering to 3 AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 3, 4-12
(Daniel N. Osherson et al. eds., 1991) (discussing the functions of memory from encoding to
retrieval); Edward E. Smith, Introduction, in AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1 (stating that
the basic aspects of thought are categorization, judgment, choice and problem solving).
171. See Potter, supra note 170, at 4 (noting that retrieving stored information “depends on
just how it was encoded, on what other information is in storage and on the circumstances of
the retrieval attempt”).
172. See Potter, supra note 170, at 5-6 (“[P]aying attention to visual appearance or sound of
a word resulted in a shallow level of encoding that is easily forgotten, whereas paying attention
to meaning results in a deeper and richer representation.”).
173. See id. at 8 (discussing why some ideas and information are encoded more deeply and
hence better memories are formed).
174. See id. at 10-11 (explaining the limits of temporal contiguity and its relevance to
preparedness and frequency or practice).
happen together are more likely to share some intrinsic or causal
relationship than are things that happen at different times,
increasing the likelihood that the association will be useful in
discovering patterns and predicting events.”175  This notion is
moderated by the principle of temporal proximity, which restricts the
number of associations that can be made.176  Potter noted, “imagine
the mental chaos that would result if all the thoughts that passed
through your mind within any one-hour interval were fully
interconnected in memory, so that each one reminded you of all the
others!”177
Although no formal studies have been done, common sense
suggests that the electronic environment has an impact on the way
students encode.  Students with a laptop computer in the classroom,
or lawyers with one in the courtroom, often transcribe rather than
engage in selective note-taking.  As they receive information, they
need not make judgments as to the relative importance of concepts,
since they possess its ability to get everything entered.  Unfortunately,
this means that, at the time of reception, the encoding may be
shallow and the associative links between important thoughts and
concepts will be weakened.178
Computer-based instruction may also affect the second phase of
the process, remembrance, categorization, and retrieval.  The
impetus for a human memory is the stimulus of a present experience
which triggers the memories of similar experiences; for that reason,
our minds store memories and ideas according to content.179  When
                                                       
An extreme example of the latter is the so-called “flashbulb” memory that enables us to
remember every detail of what we were doing at the time of some critical event, such as hearing
of President Kennedy’s assassination or the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.  Roger Brown &
James Kulik, Flashbulb Memories, 5 COGNITION 73 (1977).
175. Potter, supra note 170, at 10.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Legal education requires increased emphasis on contextualized reading.  See Peter
Dewitz, Legal Education:  A Problem of Learning from Text, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225,
246-47 (1997) (explaining the reading process and suggesting ways for professors to accelerate
learning).
179. Computer science refers to this as content addressing, a means of information retrieval
that starts with at least a part of content of the topic on which the mind seeks information.  See
Potter, supra note 170, at 14, 15 (exploring how content-addressing “finds” memories by their
identification to similar material).  If a person forgets the content address of information, the
human mind has the capability to take the inquiry to the “neighborhood” of the target
information.  See id. at 15 n.3.  Ironically, computer algorithms, despite advances in artificial
intelligence, do not store information according to content addressing, but rather use
arbitrarily assigned numeric designations.  See id.  Utilizing the concept of “content addressing”
does not mean that memories are found in a particular molecule or neutral group, rather,
memories are contained in “fluctuating patterns of synaptic connections” throughout the
brain’s neural net.  See James Geary, A Trip Down Memory’s Lanes:  Scientists Are Mapping the Many
Winding Paths Memory Takes in the Brain, TIME, May 5, 1997, at 42 (contradicting the belief that
encoding is shallow, as with the classroom or courtroom
“transcriber,” the correlative ability to locate and link information is
also compromised.180  The transcriber need not evaluate information
at the time it is received.181  This conflicts with the fact that a system
built on decisional law is, in its very nature, suppose to define rules
according to the context of the case in which they are framed.182
Finally, the third stage of the process and very core of legal
reasoning—reflection, judgment, and problem solving—is equally
influenced by a system of shallow encoding.  Indeed, in an apparent
validation of the Socratic dialogue, psychologists point out that one
way information becomes a part of working knowledge is to talk
about it or, in a process familiar to most anxious law students, to
rehearse talking about it mentally, while the professor tests the
knowledge of another student.183  When information is encoded and
categorized according to hierarchy and association at the time it is
received, it also becomes a part of the semantic knowledge that we
use to make general and predictive observations.184
Once again, we are left with a concern that working methods that
allow lawyers and students to input now and think later may be
harmful to those who give in to the temptation.  The person who uses
an infobase to cut and paste portions of a case text into a brief is
                                                       
memory is stored in the brain similar to filing cabinets in a warehouse, and instead finding that
the entire brain is responsible for memory).
180. For a general description of content addressing and memory, see J.L. Freedman & E.F.
Loftus, Retrieval of Words from Long Term Memory, J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 10, 107-
15 (1997).
181. In one study, an instructor in an undergraduate writing course used a local area
network.  Although she started with the assumption that the network conversation would be
similar to that in a normal classroom, the actual experience differed.  The pace of the class
slowed, and she found that, as the instructor, she dominated the electronic conversation and its
content.  See Ann Hill Dun & Craig Hanson, Reading and Writing on Computer Networks, as Social
Construction and Social Interaction, in EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON COMPUTERS AND COMPOSITION
STUDIES, supra note 92, at 89, 104 (acknowledging that students could not simultaneously read
and write, therefore participation in a network computer class decreased).
182. Cf. Martin Davies, Reading Cases, 50 MOD. L. REV. 407, 421 (1987) (“The primary source
of the common law is the text, and no text has meaning without a readership.  There is no
apodictic ‘true legal meaning’ . . . .”).
183. See CLAIRE E. WEINSTEIN, Assessment and Training of Student Learning Strategies, in
LEARNING STRATEGIES AND LEARNING STYLES 291, 293 (Ronald R. Schmeck ed., 1988); cf. ROGER
C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY:  A NEW LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL MEMORY 115-17 (1990)
(maintaining that in order to remember experiences people need to tell someone else,
otherwise the components mix with new experience information).
184. See SCHANK, supra note 183, at 118 (discussing the organization of semantic memory as
hierarchical with subordinate information being stored around general concepts).  Again, this
is not to suggest that information technology has a negative influence.  In enabling deep and
contextual reading, the capabilities of information technology can prove extremely helpful.
For example, Fajans and Falk note that “[t]he wide accessibility of news and information data
banks like NEXIS and Westlaw makes it possible for students to assemble a context ‘dossier’ on
any significant case in the last ten years.”  Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of
the Paraphrase:  Talking Back to Lenta, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 196 (1993).
rearranging the thoughts of others, rather than reading “closely,
critically, and multiperspectively.”185
This working style often produces a superficial level of
understanding and masks the fact that the reader has missed the
larger questions about the reasoning behind the decision.  Such a
reader may have at most recorded a result, which is not the same as
knowing the law.186  The student who types during class, and waits until
the evening, the weekend, or exam week to return to the data will
encode at progressively shallower levels, categorize with less insight,
and ultimately be handicapped at using information that has not
become a part of semantic knowledge.
Another equally well-recognized psychological truth cuts across all
of these general observations about how we work, learn and
remember:  we all have different learning styles.  We remember
differently, think differently, and use our cognitive processes to draw
conclusions differently.  I strongly suspect that some learning styles
may be harmed by a wholesale adoption of computer-based
instruction and work methods.  While an examination of the
complexities of learning theories is beyond the scope of this Essay,
some basic principles are well accepted and instructive.
On the broadest level, learning theorists recognize that one of the
most fundamental differences in learning styles and preferences may
be described as global on one end of the continuum, and analytic on
the other.187  Neither style is inherently good or bad; they simply
represent differing approaches to learning.  Indeed, beyond this
dichotomy, some argue that the optimal learning style is really a
versatile style that combines the best attributes of both
methodologies.188  Yet, most individuals have certain predilections,
and a cursory review of the characteristics of each style suggests that
integrating technology into education will affect these different
                                                       
185. Cf. Fajans & Falk, supra note 184, at 181.
186. Cf. id. at 183 (describing methods by which teachers can test and assist students in
reaching a deeper level of meaning for the information they are reading).
187. See Ronald Ray Schmeck, Strategies and Styles of Learning:  An Integration of Varied
Perspectives, in LEARNING STRATEGIES AND LEARNING STYLES 317, 328 (Ronald R. Schmeck ed.,
1988) (describing the differences between people with analytic styles and those with global
styles).  As Schmeck noted, other authors have described cognitive learning styles differently,
using terms such as holistic versus serialist, right versus left-brained, filed dependent versus filed
independent, and global versus articulated.  He argued, however that “at some level of
abstraction [sic] [all of these] are reflections of a single dimension,” for which he adopts the
global versus analytic designation.  Id. at 327 (summarizing characterizations by fellow authors
of cognitive learning styles).
188. See generally NOEL JAMES ENTWISTLE, STYLES OF LEARNING AND TEACHING 3-4 (1981)
(asserting that there is no single best way to teach because people differ in their intellectual
abilities, attitudes and personality).
learning styles in various ways.189
For example, global learners are most comfortable scanning large
amounts of information and looking for patterns and relationships.190
They are at ease with uncertainty during the learning process and do
not adhere to precise rule formulations.  Rather, they engage in what
theorists term “deep learning” by forming links or associations
between concepts they have encountered or “encoded.”191  Because
their learning does not depend on developing an ordered system of
study, global learners think intuitively and do not hesitate to factor
their feelings into the decisions they make.192  Psychology professor
Ronald Schmeck observed that “the global style and its strategies
employ simultaneous processing,” which he characterizes as involving
“the coding of a set of information into a unitary representation
which is . . . quasi-spatial in nature.”193  Because of their reluctance to
proceed with decision-making and learn in a structured way, extreme
global thinkers may fail to examine facts critically as they are
presented and are content to read and learn through expectation
and prediction.194
These factors adversely affect the reading comprehension scores of
                                                       
189. See Gordon Pask, Learning Strategies, Teaching Strategies, and Conceptual or Learning Style,
in LEARNING STRATEGIES AND LEARNING STYLES, supra note 187, at 83, 99 (observing that
constraining an individual to one learning strategy is counter-productive and counter-intuitive
while the versatile style, i.e. the absence of a rigid style, is the best cognitive style).
190. See Schmeck, supra note 187, at 328 (“Individuals with a global learning style are field
dependent with attention tending toward scanning, leading to the formation of global
impressions rather than more precisely articulated codes.”).
191. See id. (describing individuals with the global style of learning as processing
information randomly as opposed to linearly and sequentially); see also John R. Kirby, Styles,
Strategy, and Skill in Reading, in LEARNING STRATEGIES AND LEARNING STYLES, supra note 187, at
229, 259 (explaining the differences between global, analytic, and synthetic styles of
understanding).
192. See Schmeck, supra note 187, at 328 (commenting that global learners analyze with
emotion and feeling).  Other indicators also focus heavily on the degree to which individuals
make decisions intuitively.  The popular Myers-Briggs Type Indicator test, for example, classifies
individuals as either an “e” (extrovert) or “i” (introvert), an “s” (sensing) or “n” (intuitive), a “t”
(thinking) or an “f” (feeling), and finally, a “j” (judgment-making) or “p” (perceiving) person.
See GEORGE H. JENSEN & JOHN K. DITIBERIO, PERSONALITY AND THE TEACHING OF COMPOSITION
2-7 (1995) (explaining the historical development of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator test and
the psychological types identified by the test).  Using a similar test oriented to children,
psychologists concluded that the composition process was dramatically different for differing
personality types.  “S” or “sensing” children, for example, had considerably more difficulties
with writing than “I” or “intuitive” types.  See Rochelle L. Ferdman & John K. Tiberio,
Psychological Type and the Writing Process of Fifth Graders, 38 J. PSYCHOL. TYPE 24, 24 (1996)
(finding that particularized strategies based on psychological type are helpful in assisting
children with writing difficulties).  While a brief review of the literature does not refer to any
studies finding that the Myers-Briggs test is a definitive indicator of learning style, research of
the increasing use of Myers-Briggs might offer researchers an opportunity to evaluate student
learning styles.
193. Kirby, supra note 191, at 244.
194. See id. at 249 (discussing the global phase of reading development as too dependent on
context, and relying far too much on expectation and prediction).
beginning readers with global tendencies.195  Once the global reader
learns the discipline of focusing on the precise meaning of the
written word, however, the ability of the global thinker to summarize
and draw larger conclusions improves.196  Students who tend toward
global learning styles do not adapt well to competitive learning
environments, such as those that unfortunately exist in most law
schools.197  Because global learners are disinclined to focus on rules in
their learning and reasoning processes, the aggressive conditions in
some classrooms motivate these students to become dependent on
someone or something that will provide rules to them.198  While there
is a paucity of data on the subject, my suspicion based on observation
is that most law students are not global learners.
By contrast, analytic thinkers tend to review information
systematically, analyzing whether a preliminary hypothesis is the
correct one.199  They are controlled, disinclined to integrate feelings
into the thinking process, logical, and likely to learn in a sequential
process.200  It is not necessarily a “better” style of learning.201  Even
though focused on facts and data, analytics tend to review less
information because they lose interest in the fact-finding process
once they find a set of facts that supports their initial hypothesis.202
They also risk “surface” learning.203  Deeper learning, after all,
requires the ability to step back from the process and see the
relationships between concepts, components, and ideas.204  Analytics
are reluctant to delve into “deeper learning” and tend toward study
for the purpose of identification, where global learners are more
comfortable assigning deeper levels of meaning.
                                                       
195. See Schmeck, supra note 187, at 332 (arguing that most students begin as global
learners and are not as successful).
196. See id. at 332 (noting that the point at which global readers are better able to focus on
the analysis of written words signifies the appropriate time to reintorduce the global skills,
which are a necessary part of higher-level reading skills).
197. See id. at 333 (asserting that global learners became uneasy when faced with
independent choice or a competitive atmosphere).
198. See id. (explaining that global learners are more comfortable in a competitive
environment if they are able to rely on rules provided by some form of authority).
199. See id. at 328 (discussing findings that extreme analytics tend to examine less data by
systematically searching to prove or disprove a particular theory provided).
200. See id. (finding analytic thinkers are able to focus their attention on data and facts,
thereby removing emotion and feeling from their analysis).
201. See id. (arguing that neither style is better, but instead that a combination of styles
allows for the most successful learning).
202. See id. at 329 (arguing that analytics absorb less information, while global learners are
more comfortable with greater amounts of information and are better able to recognize trends
and patterns).
203. See id.
204. See id. at 330 (explaining that the deepest learning comes from evaluating critically
both surface facts and deeply imbedded information).
How does an analytic style influence the process of legal education?
Although this has not been studied, an analytic law student who has
met some measure of success as an undergraduate by focusing on
memorization may be uncomfortable predicting results by
synthesizing diverse and often conflicting decisions.  Doing so
requires the global skills of examining irreconcilable doctrines,
theories and policies, and combining these concepts with other
lawyering skills and values.  Unfortunately, lawyers and law professors
are not sensitive to the impact that learning style can have on the ease
with which one masters the law.205  My own observation suggests that
computer-based instruction may be particularly ineffective and even
harmful to analytics.  I have observed that law-byte capability
harmfully predisposes analytics to focus on particular sources that
support a viewpoint, rather than examine issues from a broader
perspective.
Finally, some people are beginning to raise questions as to whether
a computer-based environment has a disproportionately adverse
impact on women.206  A recent article in The Chronicle of Higher
Education observed that formats that facilitate distance learning tend
to be even more impersonal than large lecture courses.207  To
encourage participation, many instructors either devise interactive
exercises with right and wrong answers, and set up bulletin board
discussions in a debate format in which women are less likely to
participate.208  Perhaps these concerns will become less prevalent as
students arrive at law school having already adapted their learning
styles to computer-based instruction.209  What remains, however, is
                                                       
205. See Friedland, supra note 159, at 2 (asserting that there has been a lack of analysis of
teaching techniques and learning styles because it is taken for granted that legal education is
successful).
206. See JUDY WAJCMAN, FEMINISM CONFRONTS TECHNOLOGY 150-53 (1991) (discussing how
the traditional male monopolization of machines and technology has been extended to
computers through their use in schools); Cheris Kramarae, Technology Policy, Gender, and
Cyberspace, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 149, 151 (1997) (arguing that instructors often offer
computer training to men while ignoring women); see also Gayle Binian, Feminist Jurisprudence
and the First Amendment:  Hearing Another Voice, S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 269, 271 (1998)
(explaining that even in the early stages of childhood, boys are encouraged to utilize computers
while girls are encouraged to stay away from them); Colin Covert, Cyberspace Remains a Masculine
Environment, MPLS STAR TRIB., Nov. 13, 1995, at 1A (“Women are a tiny minority in almost
every aspect of computer culture, from programing, to product design, to everyday use.”).
207. Goldie Blumenstyk, A Feminist Scholar Questions How Women Fare in Distance Education,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 1997, at A36 (stating that women are more likely to learn
better in a classroom where there is discussion among the professor and students).
208. See id.  While it is true that e-mail may give a voice to students who are reluctant to
speak in class, this is most observable in the case of private communication with the professor.
Reticent students, according to Blumenstyk, are especially unwilling to post to public discussion
lists.  See id.
209. See Richard Warner et al., Teaching Law with Computers, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
whether the obsession with technology for its own sake will make us
better lawyers.210
III. TECHNOLOGY AND THE SOUL OF THE LAW
Beyond evaluating the value of technology, there is a deeper
concern:  Does a medium for legal education that compels lawyers to
focus on right or wrong answers equate effective lawyering with
calculation?  After all, lawyers must do more than simply
mechanically retrieve the thoughts and writings of others.211  Rather,
they must become proficient in creating their own ideas about how to
solve problems and be able to predict and influence future results.212
Lawyers must understand a great deal about law and, most
particularly, must understand that it is more than a compilation of
rules.  Lawyers must comprehend the implications of language,213
social context,214 morality,215 and emotion,216 as they bear on the
                                                       
L.J. 107, 109-10 (1997).
210. See William T. Braitwaite, How is Technology Affecting the Practice and Profession of Law?, 22
TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1991) (arguing that many lawyers and professors are more
concerned with the powers of technology than its effect on lawyering skills and the profession
in general).
211. See Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving:  A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 CAL. W.
L. REV. 375, 377-79 (1998) (describing successful lawyers as those who are able to focus on
future events and problem prevention by use of creative analysis).
212. See Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making:  The Problem of Prediction, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 1847, 1880-81 (arguing that to solve legal problems practitioners must construct
accurate predictions of future events); Roy T. Stuckey, Education for the Practice of Law, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 648, 667-71 (1996) (describing legal problem solving as a sequence of critical decisions
based on prediction of future results).
213. See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 28-63 (1993) (describing
the role linguistic theory plays in understanding legal issues).  The question of law as language
has spawned a rich literature.  Representative works include: Denis J. Brion, Saying the Law in
States, in CITIZENS AND QUESTIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE (John Brigham & Roberta Hevelson eds.,
1996); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:  CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE
OF THEORY IN LEGAL AND LITERARY STUDIES 4 (1989) (arguing there is no literal meaning to
words without context and interpretation); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE
CONSTITUTION 35, 40-41 (1992) (defining the Supreme Court’s obligation to make the
language of opinions clear for judges and the public); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW 11-12 (1963) (explaining that it is impossible to understand the law without
understanding the language lawyers employ); WHITE, supra note 28, at 215-25 (distinguishing
between law as rules and law as dialogue); Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the
Meaning of “Search” in the Fourth Amendment:  A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 550-
608 (1988) (analyzing the Fourth Amendment by using a semantic framework); Wayne
Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135  U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (1987) (arguing that
statutory language, like the common law and the Constitution must be interpreted by taking
several factors into account, including modern interpretation); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401 (1950) (illustrating how attorneys must have a firm grasp of legal vocabulary to be
persuasive).
214. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 143-45, 165-66 (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Publ’g 1985) (384-322 B.C.) (ethical reasoning requires a grasp of experience and
context); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF HUMAN GOODNESS:  LUCK AND ETHICS IN
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 290-317 (1983) (interpreting Aristotle and his belief that the
resolution of legal problems.
To illustrate, it is helpful to focus on the tasks of the lawyer.  One
of the most common tasks is that of analysis.217  Because legal rules
often conflict, such conflicts can be resolved only by understanding
and weighing the policies underlying such rules.  Further, cases often
purport to articulate rules, but in truth articulate standards.218
Because lawyers more often deal with analysis in terms of applying
standards to cases, decision-making requires a deeper level of
                                                       
judges of human condition should deliberate based on context and experience rather than on
rules or principles); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995) (examining social meaning and the effects of legal policy on social meanings); Joseph
William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442, 2443-44 (1989) (discussing the importance of
placing legal disputes in social context).
215. The doctrinal use of morality is long established, forming the basis of policies
regulating health, safety, and moral concerns.  For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), the United States Supreme Court upheld antisodomy laws to preserve the traditional
moral view that homosexuality is wrong.  In terms of legal theory, ontological political and legal
theories have long occupied a prominent place in the literature.  See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 30-32 (John Dewey Essays in Philosophy No. 4, Columbia Univ. Press 1993)
(explaining the two kinds of moral identity, political and nonpolitical, and the need for each
citizen to adjust and reconcile them); David A.J. Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle;
A Reply to John Finnis, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 464 (1987) (discussing the Kantian rejection of
“perfectionist” moral theories because they espouse a philosophy that urges rejection of much
needed common goods in a free society).
216. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1019, 1022 (1992) (“[E]motions . . . [play] a crucial role in the rational and virtuous response
to many of life’s events.”).  See generally Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact
Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996) (discussing the positives and negatives of using
narratives in legal decision making); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equality Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
83, 110-11 (1993) (comparing judges who treat an offender as one who is the by-product of a
complex web of situations and emotions with judges who treat offenders as an object with no
individual state of mind, merely an actor that needs to be deterred).  In many scenarios, such as
the distinction between murder and manslaughter, the concept and context of an emotion may
be the determinative legal question in a case.  See generally Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272-73 (1996)
(discussing ways of treating emotion in law and differences between mechanistic and evaluative
concepts of emotion).
217. See Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F.L. REV.
121, 152 (1994) (observing that the primary tasks of lawyering are problem solving and
analysis).
218. But see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183
(1989) (arguing that the creation of general legal rules, applicable to all persons and situations
is more sound than reliance on an individualized totality of the circumstances standard).  See
generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 77-78, 135-45 (1991) (discussing the
distinctions between rules and standards in the decision-making process); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992) (“[A] rule may entail an
advance determination of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the
adjudicator. . . .  A standard may entail leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible
and factual issues for the adjudicator.”); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 649-58 (1991) (describing the role rules play in the application of legal
doctrine); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383-96 (1985) (clarifying
the debate between rules and standards by outlining the pros and cons of each); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 24, 56-94 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court’s application and interpretation of
constitutional rules and standards in landmark cases).
understanding for which law-byte analysis is not suitable.
Another common task is persuasion.219  As any lawyer knows,
persuasion requires more than restating the rules.  An effective
lawyer must understand and use the theory and policy of an
argument.  An overwhelming majority of practitioners, teachers, and
scholars would agree that in the art of persuasion, an effective lawyer
must also understand and use the contexts in which rules arise to
bring the audience to the conclusion that fairness and justice dictate
that a person in the client’s situation must prevail.220  The lawyer who
does not read legal information in context will be ineffective.  Earlier
attempts to make legal information more accessible concededly had
similar effects.  Lawyers who in the past read only headnotes failed to
comprehend the legal and policy implications of a decision, and
almost certainly did not begin to understand the role of semiotics,
emotion, or even bias in a case.221  Such a modus operandi is only
encouraged by the influx of technology in the legal profession.  In
urging lawyers to utilize technology for its own sake, we are
encouraging a hypertext, jump-link analysis and exacerbating the
problem of shallow thinking.
To illustrate, in Plessy v. Ferguson,222 the United States Supreme
Court held that a state statute requiring separate seating for whites
and non-whites in railroad cars did not violate the Equal Protection
                                                       
219. As Professor Joseph Singer observed:
Lawyers spend a lot of time attempting to persuade other people. They persuade
judges to promulgate rules of law that favor their clients.  They persuade their law
partner to adopt their interpretation of existing law or to adopt their strategy for
litigation.  They persuade clients to accept the dictates of the law.  They persuade
adversaries in settlement negotiations and their client’s business associates in contract
negotiations.  They persuade legislatures to fund legal services for the poor.
Singer, supra note 214, at 2442.  See generally SONYA HAMILTON, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN
(1985) (describing effective techniques of persuasion in dealing with juries); PIERRE SCHALG &
DAVID SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING (1986) (discussing the most common and most
persuasive means of attacking a legal argument); LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR. & NANCY L. SCHULTZ,
PERSUASIVE WRITING FOR LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995) (describing persuasive
legal writing techniques); Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 872 (1983)
(asserting that legal argument must be examined under a framework of rhetorical analysis);
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law; The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 685 (1985) (“A modern law school is, among other things, a school in those
arts of persuasion about justice that are peculiar to, and peculiarly effective in, our legal
culture.”).
220. See Singer, supra note 214, at 2454-56 (arguing that in order for persuasion to occur
relationships must develop through the use of empathy and context and must be personalized
to the audience).
221. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 184, at 163 (finding that to be effective, students and
practitioners must be able to move beyond text and “link text to larger context[s]”).
222. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a state legislature may pass laws requiring the
separation of the races in its exercise of general police power), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.223  A noncritical reading of the
case and mechanical applications of its rule would arguably have
perpetuated a society of forced segregation.
Fortunately, in subsequent actions, the plaintiffs convinced the
Supreme Court that this rule should not be applied mechanically.224
In Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,225 Missouri argued unsuccessfully
that it could exclude an African-American applicant from law school
if it paid his tuition to an integrated law school in Illinois.226  Similarly,
in Sweatt v. Painter,227 Texas unsuccessfully sought to bar admission of
minorities from the University of Texas law school by constructing a
separate educational facility for minority applicants.228
In holding that Texas had acted unconstitutionally, the Court gave
several reasons why the Plessy rule did not apply, including the fact
that Plessy denied equality of opportunity; that it was not a precedent
deserving broad application; and that it was unjust and shameful.229
The extent to which these factors—shame and a desire to achieve
justice—should and did influence litigation and ultimately resulted in
Brown v. Board of Education,230 can be debated elsewhere.231  The
question is whether a lawyer who is trained to utilize legal sources
reduced to the unquestioning recitation of hypertext nuggets will
fully appreciate the social consequences of legal debate.
Another example reflecting why law-byte analysis is inappropriate
comes from a story related by Professor Joseph Singer in his article,
Persuasion.232  There, Professor Singer described his frustration at
students’ reaction to a decision in a case involving a plant closing:
A factory has operated in a city for more than fifty years.  The city
has grown up around the factory and has come to rely upon it, as
have its employees.  The company has benefited enormously from
its long-term relationship with the workers and the community.  Yet
the company appears unconcerned for their welfare.  Instead, its
officers focus on the bottom line; their only goal is to maximize
                                                       
223. See id. at 544.
224. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958).
225. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
226. See id. at 349-50 (holding that if a state provides education or training, denial of that
training based solely on race is unconstitutional).
227. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
228. See id. at 635-36 (deciding that the state’s action was unconstitutional due to the
fundamental inequalities between the University of Texas law school and law school founded
solely for African-Americans).
229. See id.
230. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
231. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:  A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) (describing the process of adjudication when a
legal rule conflicts with the decision-maker’s desired outcome).
232. See Singer, supra note 214, at 2447.
profits and returns to shareholders.  Ruled by a distant and
seemingly unapproachable board of directors, the company closes
the factory, putting thousands of people out of work, many of them
permanently.  The city faces a crisis.  Many people experience
downward mobility.  Even most of those who find work face
reduced living standards.  All of the workers face grave difficulties
in putting their lives back together.  It is a story of betrayal.  The
workers trusted the company and depended on it.  The company
lived off that trust, took advantage of it, and finally, abused it.  Yet
most of the students did not see it that way.  On the contrary,
although they believed that plant closings were regrettable, many
of them understood the closings to represent a rather happy
story—the efficient restructuring of production through the
invisible hand of the free market.
*  *  *  *
This situation worried me, but not because most of the students
disagreed with my particular law reform proposal.  It worried me as
a teacher that my students failed to understand that many courts
would understand plant closings as hard cases.  Although they
could easily recite doctrinal and policy arguments on behalf of the
workers, they seemed unaware that some judges would react
sympathetically to those claims.  It was partly a matter of
professional competence:  they could not competently represent a
company in a plant closing case if they could not see, and feel, the
power of the arguments on the other side.  To do a good job
representing either side, they had to understand this to be . . . a
hard case.233
How much more limited might the discussion have been if the
students had simply scrolled through the case to find the holding and
cut and pasted it into their property law outlines?  The fact that
lawyers now research cases looking for isolated word combinations
exacerbates this tendency.  Given that lawyers and law students often
have “refused to acknowledge context—to acknowledge the actual
lives of human beings affected by a particular abstract principle,” 234
how much difficulty will students have in a method of study that
                                                       
233. Id. at 2445, 2447-48.  Singer attempted to give his students a sense of context by
reading an announcement in class that the law school had decided to address the lawyer
competency problem by adopting a policy of failing one-third of the entering class, and asking
students to formulate what arguments they might have in a lawsuit to enjoin the school from
changing the grading policies that were in effect at the time of their admission.  Singer found
that this approach was successful in enabling the students to place the arguments for the plant
workers in context.  See id. at 2454.
234. Mari Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Vision of Human Nature; A Feminist
Critique of Rawl’s Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613, 619 (1986).
emphasizes hypertext-linked rules and discourages the close reading
of cases. Students who cannot understand the stories of the law
cannot understand the law.235  And yet, can we reasonably expect legal
readers to understand stories and contexts when the profession
constantly seems to value the use of tools and methodology that
emphasize speed and rule extraction over depth and reflection?
Perhaps there are those who view the law’s highest and best calling as
sterile formalism.236  If the profession and society, however, want to
make that choice, it should be a choice and not a byproduct of a rush
to computer-based platforms for learning and work.
Finally, when we work with the law in a format that encourages
formalism and rule extraction, do we retreat from dialogue about
policy and theory?  Even without the allure of technology,
commentators have already expressed concern that law students do
not read legal texts deeply enough, and that their inability to engage
in “close reading” impairs their ability to use precedents creatively in
the lawyering process.237  As Elizabeth Fajans and Mary Falk observed,
it is not enough to train students to produce documents “superficially
comparable to those a practitioner might produce.  [Students also
must] appreciate the dialogues and debates that occur within the
discourse community, to contribute to the ‘ongoing conversation of
the law.’”238
One also wonders whether the law’s embrace of technology will
have an impact on the intellectual richness, flexibility, and justness of
the common law.  Does excessive reliance on the use of technology
overly emphasize rules and certainty at the expense of other goals
and qualities we value in lawyering and the legal system:  creativity,
                                                       
235. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 184, at 204-05 (asserting that in order for lawyers to
contribute effectively to the developing legal discourse they must be able to think
independently of text); cf. Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 147, at 24,
36 (arguing that the reemergence of stories is welcomed as the “healthy disruption” in an often
static legal doctrine); White, supra note 219, at 691-92 (“[L]aw is a way of telling a story about
what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by writing an ending to it.”).
236. See Scalia, supra note 218, at 1178-81 (arguing for the creation of general principles, as
opposed to reliance on fact-based discretion, because of the greater predictability rules allow
and because such rules empower judges to be courageous and stand up to popular opinion).
But see. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 588-91 (1987) (describing the
consequences of blindly following precedent without concern for context).
237. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 184, at 163 (arguing that the legal profession, at all levels,
requires more than merely scanning and paraphrasing opinions).  Professors Fajans and Falk
used a number of innovative teaching techniques to get students to engage in close reading, to
read beyond the rules needed for case briefing for what is “implicit [on the page]-literary style
and jurisprudential or interpretive posture—and for what is not there at all—legal and
historical context and omission of fact or lapses in logic.” Id. at 169.  Once their students
mastered close reading, the students approached writing assignments with far more maturity
and creativity.  See id. at 169.
238. Id. at 171.
justice, equity, compassion, and the ability to discover our common
fundamental values?
I do not pose this question lightly because the issue arises in
multiple contexts.  Every day courts must address values in cases
requiring constitutional interpretation,239 or the evaluation of
transactional fairness,240 or reasonableness in the area of torts.
                                                       
239. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-70 (1980) (discussing how the
Supreme Court is charged with applying fundamental principles and how it defines values).  In
his chapter on fundamental values in the context of constitutional interpretation, Ely notes that
a multiplicity of factors and concepts may come into play in the decision-making process,
including the judge’s own values, natural law, reason, tradition, consensus, and the neutral
principles outlined by Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) (arguing that the Supreme Court should apply that same principle
to like cases).
The exploration of values as an evolving concept in the constitutional context has been the
subject of extensive discourse. While the originalist versus responsivist interpretation debate
remains, the classic statement of the responsivist position is that of Justice Holmes:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the constitution
of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of
its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an
organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).  For other examples discussing this viewpoint,
see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS—DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 35-
38 (1995) (discussing the implications of the responsive interpretation); Karl N. Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1934) (stating that the action and
attitudes of men give life to the Constitution); Hanna Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987) (writing that the Constitution is what we make of it and depends
upon what we do).
The inclusion of a values analysis is at least as old as the distributive/corrective justice
dichotomy from Aristotle, and it describes the role of justice in determining resource
allocation.  See II ARISTOTLE, On Particular Justice, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE:  THE
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1784-85 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (writing that a particular
kind of justice is presented in the allocation of resources and that awards must be given
according to merit).  As a modern commentator has observed:
[T]here are problems of distributing resources, opportunities, profits and advantages,
roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens—in general, the common stock and
the incidents of communal enterprise, which do not serve the common good unless and
until they are appropriated to particular individuals.
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 166 (1980).  Corrective justice, as a general
rule, would appear more likely to be resolvable using rule oriented thinking, since what are
involved are not questions of the allocation of social resources, but rather questions arising in
conjunction with relations between individuals.  See id.  Not surprisingly, it has been in
conjunction with this type of issue, and in courses like contracts and evidence, where
computerized instruction has been most successful and least controversial.
240. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract:  The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of
Satisfaction,” 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 432 (1995) (discussing the evolution of contract law and
the inclusion of questions of fairness and moral considerations); James Gordley, Enforcing
Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547, 613 (1995) (arguing that courts will not enforce promises that
enrich one person at the expense of another without prudent reason to do so); Thomas Lee
Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273,
307-14 (1991) (discussing the role of values and relevance of moral theory in the analysis of
corporations); Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought:  Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985) (discussing aspects of nineteenth-century economic
Is the ability to locate “law-bytes” and to chain-cite legal authority
the objective of lawyers and legal educators, or should we have
grander goals?  The question is one of special importance in a
common law system where the day to day tasks of lawyering  affect the
actual process of creating law.241  The way in which we work with the
law is eminently capable of influencing the law’s development.242
Adopting even the most positivist of stances—that legal rules in a
positivist world must derive only from defined sources—it
nevertheless becomes apparent that changes in the methods by which
lawyers work and gain access to information will produce changes in
the law.243
Has the profession confronted the fact that new technologies are
tools that will alter our methods, modes, and culture of decision
making?  Does the use of computers to teach, read, and work with the
law make lawyers and judges less likely to consider policy, theory,
justice, values, and emotions?  Justice Scalia might argue that the law
                                                       
thought in relation to law); G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules
in Commercial Cases:  An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1198, 1199 (1988) (stating
that courts have increasingly decided business disputes by relying on ethical standards); Eyal
Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretations and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1710, 1723 (1997) (stating that any interpreter of a contract would be required to take into
account public values and parties).
241. The impact of lawyering on the development of the law is of unique importance in the
common law system.  Common law judges depend upon lawyers acting within the adversary
system to inform and suggest legal arguments.  See HERBERT JACOB ET AL., COURTS, LAW, AND
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVIST PERSPECTIVE 29 (1996).  But see Teich, supra note 14, at 496.
Professor Teich cited the Kulik, Kulik & Cohen study for the proposition that computer-assisted
instruction has in fact been more effective in the “soft” disciplines of the humanities than it has
been in the “hard” disciplines of science, mathematics, engineering, and agriculture.  See id.
Teich, however, while a proponent of computer-assisted instruction, suggests that this
surprising fact is explainable by the following:  teachers in these disciplines are more frequently
trained in behavioral analysis and make better use of the programs, students in the “hard”
disciplines often are already achieving at or near their maximum potential, and the use of
computers in soft disciplines requires instructors to define clearly the objectives of each class,
something that soft discipline teachers do not always otherwise do.  See id. at 496-97.
As Daniel Goleman observed:
Conventional wisdom among cognitive scientists entails a cold, hard-nosed processing
of fact.  It is hyperrational, rather like Star Trek’s Mr. Spock, the archetype of dry
information bytes unmuddied by feeling, embodying the idea that emotions have no
place in intelligence and only muddle our picture of mental life.  The cognitive
scientists who embraced this view have been seduced by the computer as the operative
model of mind, forgetting that, in reality, the brain’s wetware is awash in a messy,
pulsating puddle of neurochemicals, nothing like the sanitized, orderly silicon that has
spawned the guiding metaphor for mind.
DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 40-41 (1995).
242. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 58, at 1103-08 (positing that the nature of law and the
definition of legal positivism are in the process of a change motivated by the increasing
amounts and types of information used by decision makers).
243. See id. at 1105-08 (arguing that more extensive access to online information technology
is changing the law by causing more reliance on non-legal information).
should disregard such values.244  Others would argue that mercy,
compassion, equity, and emotion do belong in the law.245  The
jurisprudential debate need not be resolved here.  What is important
is that hypertext minds and hypertext analysis may be so fixated on
mechanical identification of rules that they will likely not consider
these questions at all.
For good or ill, lawyers occupy positions of extraordinary power
and importance in our society to a degree unimaginable in civil law
jurisdictions.  The fabric of the law itself is shaped by the decisions of
courts, and lawyers have outdistanced all other professions in
occupying places of importance within society’s political power
structure.246  Given this context, legal educators and mentors in the
profession have a special obligation to foster work cultures that
encourage broad perspectives.  We should strive for illumination and
deplore superficiality,247 and we should use processes that inspire
lawyers to make virtues and values a part of the decision-making
process.248  We do not serve the law well by using technology in a way
that assumes right or wrong answers, and does not encourage legal
analysis that is critical, inquisitive, novel, moral, equitable, and just.
                                                       
244. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739-52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
jurors who hold a subjective belief that the death penalty is a proper punishment can still make
an impartial decision during the sentencing phase of a capital murder case).  For a spirited
debate on the role of values in legal analysis, compare Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values:  A
Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 197, 209-17 (1994) (arguing that values have
a place in justifying legal rules), with Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 219, 222
(1994) (arguing that values are too easily appropriated by any force, and too vulnerable to
manipulation).
245. See Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”:  Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991-92 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court does not understand
mercy’s place at the penalty phase of capital trials); cf. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1462-67 (1995) (arguing for individual determination in criminal
cases).
246. Two-thirds of all U.S. Presidents have been lawyers.  See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 1401-02 (Michael Nelson ed., 1989); THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 1998, at 530 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1998) (describing briefly the biographies
of all the presidents).
247. See Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens:  Legal Education and the Virtues of
the Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1905, 1930-35 (1993) (arguing that there are good reasons to address
the morality of law).
248. See id. at 1909 (questioning whether legal education devotes sufficient attention to what
she terms two possible virtues of rulers:  “empathy, the capacity to care about the lives of
individuals different from oneself; and, liberality, the virtue of giving what one owns to the right
people for the right reason”).
